Michael Lewis, Greece, and Corruption

Michael Lewis has moved from Wall Street, to baseball, the left tackle, Iceland, the credit collapse and on to Greece. He takes a look at Greece’s financial crisis in the October issue of Vanity Fair: Beware of Greeks Bearing Bonds.

One issue is the debt hangover. Greece has about $400 billion in outstanding government debt and $800 billion in pension obligations. That $1.2 trillion is about a quarter-million for each working adult.

Another is the generous wages paid to government works. The average government worker makes three times the wage of the average private-sector job. The national railroad has annual revenues of €100 million, but has an annual wage bill of €400 million and another €300 million in other expenses.

Then there is the corruption. “It’s simply assumed, for instance, that anyone who is working for the government is meant to be bribed.”

The government is notorious for pulling tax collectors off the streets during election years. An estimated 2/3 of Greek doctors report incomes of less than €12,000. Self-employment means self reporting of income. Only those salaried employees who have taxes taken from their paycheck get stuck paying taxes. Greece is a poor country full of rich people.

Just to prove the point, he didn’t get a receipt for his coffee with a whistle-blowing tax collector. Even the fancy hotel was not paying the sales tax it owed.

“Everyone is pretty sure everyone is cheating on his taxes, or bribing politicians, or taking bribes, or lying about the value of his real estate. And this total absence of faith in one another is self-reinforcing. The epidemic of lying and cheating and stealing makes any sort of civic life impossible; the collapse of civic life only encourages more lying, cheating, and stealing. “

Greece was desperate to become part of the European Union. That meant they needed to get their deficit under control and prove a stable economy. It seems like they did it by “cooking their books” instead of economic policy. They simply moved expenses and obligations off their balance sheet to earn their 2001 entrance to the EU, swapping the drachma for the euro.

What went wrong?

Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis was involved in a scandal, leading to his ouster and the ouster of his government. The new finance minister took the more honest approach and began finding all of the financial skeletons.

[He] found so much less money in the government’s coffers than it had expected that it decided there was no choice but to come clean. The prime minister announced that Greece’s budget deficits had been badly understated—and that it was going to take some time to nail down the numbers. Pension funds and global bond funds and other sorts who buy Greek bonds, having seen several big American and British banks go belly-up, and knowing the fragile state of a lot of European banks, panicked. The new, higher interest rates Greece was forced to pay left the country—which needed to borrow vast sums to fund its operations—more or less bankrupt. In came the I.M.F. to examine the Greek books more closely; out went whatever tiny shred of credibility the Greeks had left. “How in the hell is it possible for a member of the euro area to say the deficit was 3 percent of G.D.P. when it was really 15 percent?” a senior I.M.F. official asks. “How could you possibly do something like that?”

The other focus of the Lewis’ story is the Vatopedi Monastery that was part of the Karamanlis scandal. The monastery had title to a lake in northern Greece. They convinced the Greek government to trade for the ownership of the lake with government owned property. This included the gymnastics center from the 2004 Olympics. The lake was worth roughly €55 million and the government property they received is probably worth many time that amount. It’s even more valuable now that the monastery has convinced the government to re-zone big chunks of the property for commercial purposes.

It seems the monks just want to use the money to rebuild their monastery. Nobody is claiming the leadership of the monastery is pocketing the money.  The same is not true on the other side of the transaction.

Sources:

Image of the Parthenon is by Simon Tong.

The Collapse of AIG

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There have been many stories about the collapse of AIG. There have also been many stories about the internal flaws at AIG. The pitchforks were out when bonuses were announced in March. One of those executives was Jake DeSantis who wrote a New York Times OP-ED about his bonus. (AIG Bonus – My Thoughts) It turns out that Mr. DeSantis also contacted Michael Lewis.

The end result is a story in the August issue of Vanity Fair: The Man Who Crashed the World. As you can guess from the title, Lewis pins much of the blame on one man: Joe Cassano, the former president of AIG Financial Products.

After reading the article, I am not sure it’s fair to pin so much blame on Mr. Cassona. The article does provide a great deal of insight and clarity into the interconnections between AIG, sub-prime lending, credit default swaps, and the collapse of US house prices.

“There was a natural role for a blue-chip corporation with the highest credit rating to stand in the middle of swaps and long-term options and the other risk-spawning innovations. The traits required of this corporation were that it not be a bank—and thus subject to bank regulation and the need to reserve capital against the risky assets—and that it be willing and able to bury exotic risks on its balance sheet. There was no real reason that company had to be A.I.G.; it could have been any AAA-rated entity with a huge balance sheet. Berkshire Hathaway, for instance, or General Electric. A.I.G. just got there first.”

At first, credit default swaps were mostly for commercial credit risk. Then, they started to expanding to consumer credit risk. The thought inside AIG Financial Products was that it was sufficiently diverse that it was unlikely to all bad at once.  At first, the consumer products did not include sub-prime loans. Then, in 2004, the less credit-worthy sub-prime loans started becoming part of the credit pools.  They eventually pulled the plug, feeling confident that their 2005 risks would not suffer any credit losses. (They were wrong.)

The bigger problem came when AIG lost its AAA rating, the day after Hank Greenberg was forced to resign. With its AAA rating, AIG has resisted being required to post collateral to back up its outstanding obligations under the derivative products it was selling. With a downgrade in its credit rating, it had agreed to post collateral. When the debt AIG insured started going bad, AIG had to put up cash collateral to back up its obligations. There was the equivalent of a run on a bank.

Lewis alludes to AIG’s risk-taking for residential loans may have been one of the factors that contributed to the dramatic run up in house prices, that eventually lead to more sub-prime borrowing, to a further increase in home prices and to more bad debt. That liquidity and poor underwriting lead to loans being made that, in retrospect, should not have been made.

Lastly, since AIG turned off its supply of risk-taking for residential mortgage loans, banks kept more of that risk on their books. That may have lead to the collapse of Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers.

Lewis pins the blame on Cassano for not realizing that AIG was increasing taking on more sub-prime risk than they realized. At one point, when pools were up to 95% sub-prime, many internal risk analysts guessed that there was no more than 20%. Even when confronted with this Cassano dismissed the problem, conluding that house prices could never fall everywhere in the United States at once. (He was wrong.)

You can read the article and determine for yourself if Cassano should really be the fall guy.

In the end, the lesson to be learned for compliance and risk professionals is the importance of listening to your front line employees. They see many problems coming long before you do.

If you like that article, Michael Lewis also did a great story in the April issue of Vanity Fair on the financial collapse in Iceland: Iceland’s Meltdown.

UPDATE: The Wall Street Journal published an article indicating that Mr. Cassano is the subject of a grand jury inquiry. Prosecutors Are Poised to Impanel AIG Grand Jury. The possible case against Mr. Cassano (and others) could rely partly on tape recordings of 2007 phone calls involving AIG Financial Products employees who discussed the value of their derivatives trades.

“Hello, Madoff” What the Secretary Saw

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The June issue of Vanity Fair continues its coverage of Bernie Madoff. This issue centers around Eleanor Squillari, who spent two decades as Madoff’ private secretary.

The article, entitled “Hello, Madoff!,” is accompanied by more than a dozen intimate photos of Madoff and his family from as far back as the 1970s.

According to Eleanor Squillari, Bernie Madoff was a sexist, egomaniacal, short-tempered control freak—yet everybody loved him.

At first, I was not interested in the story. It looked a little sordid for me. Then I saw this quote:

Squillari recalls an unusually prescient conversation she had with Madoff years earlier, after a client’s secretary had been arrested for embezzlement. “You know, [he] has to take some responsibility for this,” Madoff told Squillari. “He should have been keeping an eye on his personal finances. That’s why I’ve always had Ruth watching the books. Nothing gets by Ruth.” Squillari says she was surprised when he added: “Well, you know what happens is, it starts out with you taking a little bit, maybe a few hundred, a few thousand. You get comfortable with that, and before you know it, it snowballs into something big.”

Perhaps the story will give us some insight into what makes a person go bad.

For a preview, there is a video of Vanity Fair’s Mark Seal interviewing Eleanor Squillari: Bernie Madoff’s Secretary Spills His Secrets.

Part I of Vanity Fair’s coverage of Madoff was in the April issue: Madoff’s World.