Nobody Saw It Coming? Magnetar Saw it Coming

After reading Michael Lewis’ The Big Short this weekend, it’s clear that some people saw the collapse of the residential mortgage market coming.

This American Life had a story this weekend about another investor who also saw it coming: Magnetar Capital.

(A magnetar is a neutron star with a magnetic field 100-1000 times stronger than that of an ordinary neutron star.)

The story paints the picture of Magnetar buying the most risky tranche of subprime CDOs while at the same time buying credit default swaps against less risky tranches of the same subprime CDOs.

The equity tranche is the last to get paid, the riskiest portion of the CDO and the hardest to sell. Without someone to buy the equity a CDO was less likely to be put together in the first place. Also keep in mind that CDOs were often composed of the equity and junkier pieces of mortgage backed securities as a well as a kitchen soup of mortgage securities.

Pro Publica and This American Life interpret Magentar’s trade as one to sustain the volume of subprime CDOs, which sustained the volume of subprime mortgage backed securities, which sustained the origination of subprime mortgage loans, which sustained the bubble in housing prices. They claim that Magnetar’s trades made the bubble worse. By buying the equity tranche, they enabled the creation of the entire subprime CDO and had more to bet against.

Magnetar denies that was their intent. They were merely combining long positions with short positions.

I assume they saw a weakness in the pricing of CDOs and CDO CDSs and made trades to exploit the weakness. Others, like the people in The Big Short saw weaknesses in CDOs and took bets on their downfall. I doubt any of them realized that the collapse of the CDOs would result in something as catastrophic as the Great Panic.

That didn’t stop This American Life from comparing the Magnetar trades to the plot of The Producers. In the movie, a theatrical producer and his accountant attempt to cheat their investors by deliberately producing a flop show on Broadway. They realize they can oversell the shares in the production and make more money if it the show flops than if it becomes successful.

They even made a song parody based on the Broadway musical adaptation of the movie: Bet Against the American Dream.

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Incentives, Productivity and NUMMI

I recently listened to a great show from This American Life. They covered the story of New United Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI). General Motors and Toyota opened NUMMI in 1984 as a joint venture so Toyota could start building cars in the US. Toyota showed GM the secrets of its production system and how Toyota made cars of much higher quality and much lower cost than GM.

There are some great lessons in the story for compliance professionals. In part because the story can be seen through the lens of incentives and corporate culture. Two topics that are important to compliance.

For GM plant managers, their pay was based on productivity. They needed to get lots of cars out the door at the end of the assembly line. It didn’t matter whether the car could drive off the line or had to be towed. Workers told the story of cars coming off the line with a Monte Carlo having the front end of a Regal. They would just let them run down the line and out into the yard. Then they were fixed out there (with overtime). The emphasis was on quantity. At GM, the production line could never stop.

The Toyota system empowered the line workers to stop the line if there was a problem they couldn’t fix. The emphasis was to fix the problem at its source and not defer it for later. The emphasis was on quality. (Some of the recent problems at Toyota can be blamed on changing their focus to quantity. They wanted to be the biggest car company in the world.)

In spreading the Toyota system, there was resistance from both the company and the union. The union was opposed because the system was more efficient and would reduce the workers at a plant by 25%. The NUMMI plant was the re-opening of a shut down GM plant. The union was out of work and was more open to change. It was either change the way you work or don’t work at all.

GM had trouble empowering its worker and changing the corporate culture that comes along with the Toyota production line. They thought workers would just stop the line to play cards and get coffee.

Its worth an hour of your time to listen to the story.

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Weekend Book Review: The Informant

I’ve had Kurt Eichenwald’s The Informant on my reading list for a long time. It dropped farther down the list after seeing the previews for the Steven Soderbergh movie. Why read the book when you can watch the movie?

What raised my interest was hearing a great radio segment from This American Life that tells some of the background of the price fixing conspiracy and FBI cooperating witness Mark Whitacre: The Fix is in.

I have to admit that while reading the book, I had the image of Matt Damon in my mind as the character of Mark Whitacre. The other image that stands out is the scene in the movie previews with Damon (playing Whitacre) as he is fiddling with the hidden tape recorder in his briefcase. As you can see from a video of the meeting, Whitacre really did open open up the hidden compartment and check out the tape recorder.

The true story in the book is a crazy tale. Whitacre came forward as a cooperating witness to the FBI, telling them that his company, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), was engaged in price-fixing for the global market for lysine. The allegations quickly spread to other products and to kickbacks. Whitacre was a great witness, eagerly taping conversations of illicit activity and clearly willing to take down his colleagues and management of the company.

The story wanders a bit, periodically gets stagnant, then explodes as new secrets are revealed. The author, Kurt Eichenwald, tells the story from the perspective of the FBI. If the story were not true, it could have been streamlined and the characters could have been explored in more depth. But it’s a true story with real people. So you have to let the story evolve as the FBI uncovers more and more of the activity of ADM, and unfortunately more and more of the activity of Whitacre.

Whitacre had problems. These problems become apparent and worsen as the story progresses. The perfect witness ends up not being so perfect. Inconsistencies begin to appear and then grow worse.

Kurt Eichenwald covered the story for The New York Times and interviewed most of the participants in writing the book. He tells the story by methodically recording the six-year investigation and deconstructing the disturbed Whitacre.

Add the book to your reading list and move it towards the top.

Compliance, Van Halen and Brown M&M’s

You may have heard the story about Van Halen’s banning of brown M&M’s from its dressing room. I chalked it up to the pampered life of rock stars. (Especially, when compared to the more mundane life of a chief compliance officer.)

I just listened to the latest episode of  This American Life which revealed that the provision was not about pampering. It was about compliance.  Host Ira Glass talked with John Flansburgh (from the band They Might Be Giants) and he explained why the M&M clause was actually an ingenious business strategy. They recounted an except from David Lee Roth’s autobiography, Crazy from the Heat:

Van Halen was the first band to take huge productions into tertiary, third-level markets. We’d pull up with nine eighteen-wheeler trucks, full of gear, where the standard was three trucks, max. And there were many, many technical errors — whether it was the girders couldn’t support the weight, or the flooring would sink in, or the doors weren’t big enough to move the gear through.The contract rider read like a version of the Chinese Yellow Pages because there was so much equipment, and so many human beings to make it function. So just as a little test, in the technical aspect of the rider, it would say “Article 148: There will be fifteen amperage voltage sockets at twenty-foot spaces, evenly, providing nineteen amperes . . .” This kind of thing. And article number 126, in the middle of nowhere, was: “There will be no brown M&M’s in the backstage area, upon pain of forfeiture of the show, with full compensation.”

So, when I would walk backstage, if I saw a brown M&M in that bowl . . . well, line-check the entire production. Guaranteed you’re going to arrive at a technical error. They didn’t read the contract. Guaranteed you’d run into a problem. Sometimes it would threaten to just destroy the whole show. Something like, literally, life-threatening.

Van Halen used the candy as a warning flag for an indication that something may be wrong. I see some lessons to be learned.

Update:

Diamond Dave talking about Brown M&Ms.

Brown M&Ms from Van Halen on Vimeo.

(via NPR Music’s The Record: The Truth About Van Halen And Those Brown M&Ms by Jacob Ganz

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