Tag: Supreme Court

A Flurry of Stories on Mutual Fund Fees

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Over the last few days there has been renewed interest in the upcoming Supreme Court case that will should rule on the fees charged by mutual funds. Back in May, I published Supreme Court to Decide on Investment Company Act Case after they agreed to hear Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P. I didn’t expect much mainstream press coverage of the case until the decision comes out next winter.

Over the weekend, Wall Street Journal columnist Jason Zweig published Can the Supreme Court Undress High Fund Fees? which pointed out that this case will “hit you right in the pocket.” Then The New York Times ran Supreme Court to Hear Case on Executive Pay which portrayed the as one focused on out of control executive pay. It sounds like the press has figured out that the case could have some broad implications on the way mutual funds decide what fees to charge.

Under §36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 the “the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company.”

The traditional standard was that a breach of fiduciary duty occurs when the adviser charges a fee that is “so disproportionately large” or “excessive” that it “bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch, 694 F.2d 923 (2nd Cir. 1982)

The Jones v. Harris case starts with the claim that the fees are excessive because they far exceed those charged to independent clients. Like many investment advisers, Harris charges less for institutional clients that invest in funds similar to its Oakmark funds. The plaintiffs take the position that a fiduciary should not charge a different price to its controlled clients than it does to its independent clients.

Certainly, mutual funds rarely fire their advisers. But investors do fire the advisers by moving their money to different mutual funds and investments.The decision is likely to focus more on the procedure for setting fees than the absolute value of the fees.

It sounds like this case is getting tarted up as a blast against executive compensation. But really, its about the dense language in the Investment Company Act, fiduciary duty and compliance. Since the decision could have a broad impact on lots of peoples’ investments, it will likely get lots of coverage at the oral arguments on November 2, 2009 and whenever the decision comes out.

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Supreme Court to Decide on Investment Company Act Case

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There has been a lot of focus on the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the PCAOB case: Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (08-861). It squarely addresses an interesting administrative law question. I also find it interesting that this case originates from the last bout of financial fraud in the press (the collapse of Enron) and comes to the Supreme Court during the media coverage of the next bout of financial fraud.

Although it is less interesting, the Supreme Court also agreed to hear another case that may interest compliance professionals: Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P., (No. 08-586). This case focuses on the fees paid to the investment adviser of a mutual fund.

Harris Associates advises the Oakmark complex of mutual funds. Plaintiffs own shares in several of the Oakmark funds and contend that their fees are too high and in violation §36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.

The Oakmark Fund paid Harris Associates 1% per year of the first $2 billion of the fund’s assets, 0.9% of the next $1 billion, 0.8% of the next $2 billion, and 0.75% of anything over $5 billion. These fees are roughly the same as other funds of similar size and investment goal. Mutual funds are largely captive to their investment advisers. There is an ability to change advisers and there is a requirement for independent directors. In my view the market really controls the fees. If one fund charges less in fees than another fund with  similar performance  and investment goal, investors will put their money in the less expensive fund.

Plaintiffs’ claim that the fees are excessive because they far exceed those charged to independent clients. Like many investment advisers, Harris charges less for institutional clients that invest in funds similar to the Oakmark funds. The plaintiffs take the position that a fiduciary should not charge a different price to its controlled clients than it does to its independent clients.

Under §36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 the “the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company.”

The traditional standard was that a breach of fiduciary duty occurs when the adviser charges a fee that is “so disproportionately large” or “excessive” that it “bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch, 694 F.2d 923 (2nd Cir. 1982)

The district court concluded that Harris Associates had not violated the Act and granted summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld that ruling. But they rejected the traditional standard and crafted a new one. Instead, the court adopted a standard that an allegation that an adviser charged excessive fees for advisory services does not state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under § 36(b), unless the adviser also misled the fund’s board of directors in obtaining their approval of the compensation. Section 36(b) does not say that fees must be “reasonable” in relation to a judicially created standard.

I find it funny that the plaintiffs had argued that the court should not follow the traditional standard in Gartenberg. They won on that point, but still lost with the new standard.

Since one part of the country is subject to the traditional standard in Gartenberg and another part is subject to this new standard, I assume the Supreme Court took the case to clean up this split. It will give the Court an opportunity to clarify the proper scope of the fiduciary duty that investment advisers owe to fund shareholders with respect to their compensation.

In the end, I do not think the ruling will have much impact on consumers. No plaintiff has succeeded on a § 36(b) claim against a fund advisor. But it is likely to have an impact on compliance and governance programs.

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Supreme Court to Rule on Sarbanes-Oxley

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On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to rule on the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002 created PCAOB as a new government agency to regulate firms that audit the books of publicly traded companies. The key question in the case is whether the Act violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. The case is Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (08-861).

In this challenge, Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP, LLP contend that Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 , 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-19, violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution and separation of powers because it does not permit adequate Presidential control of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Congress made the Board’s exercise of its duties subject to the control of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC sets the rules and may remove members. In turn, the President appoints members of the SEC, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and may remove them for cause. In appellants’ view this  scheme vests Board members “with far reaching executive power while completely stripping the President of the authority to appoint or remove those members or otherwise supervise or control their exercise of that power.”

Effectively, they object that the members of PCAOB, an independent agency, are appointed by the SEC, another independent agency, instead of the President. Neither the President of the United States nor a Presidential alter ego possesses any power to remove PCAOB members for cause or otherwise.

The D.C. Circuit did not accept this challenge and ruled in favor of PCAOB and the United States.

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“Proceeds” From Money Laundering

In US v. Santos (06-1005), the United States Supreme Court sent confusion into what is required for a conviction under the federal money laundering statue: 18 U.S.C. 1956.The problem is the use of the word “proceeds” in 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1). Does “proceeds” meean gross receipts or profits?

The justinces could not get together in a clear decision with “Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join, and in which Justice Thomas joins as to all but Part IV,” with Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion.  The result was to dismiss the money laundering charge against Efrain Santos and Benedicto Diaz.

But it is unclear if the government needs to find profits for a conviction. Proving profits would mean comparing gross receipts against expenes and seeing there was a profit. As the government argued, criminals do not keep good records.

Kay – Certiorari Denied

The U.S. Supreme Court will not be reviewing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kay v. U.S. (cert denied shows up page 8 of the Orders List from October 6, 2008.)

Kay argued that the FCPA didn’t apply to bribes to reduce taxes, or that if it applied, the “obtaining or retaining” language in the law (the business nexus element) is so ambiguous that enforcement in their case would be unfair.

Compliance programs need to be aimed not just at bribes intended to directly help obtain business from foreign governments but also to any overseas public bribery that might create a commercial advantage. Complaince needs to find any payments to reduce taxes, speed up refunds, jump customs lines, obtain favorable inspections, manipulate business registrations, reduce utility costs, or enhance property usage.