Tag: Francis G.X. Pileggi

Revoking a Subscription Agreement

Private equity funds investors sign a subscription agreement, promising to deliver cash when the fund makes a capital call. In a recent Delaware case, investors sought to revoke their subscription agreements and recover their capital contribution. They were investors in a Lehman Brothers sponsored investment fund.

In 2007 the three plaintiffs became limited partners in Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking Partners IV L.P. After Lehman declared bankruptcy, the the Fund’s management team bought out Lehman, took over the Fund’s general partner and investment advisor, and changed the Fund’s name to Trilantic Capital Partners IV, L.P.

Among the other investors in the fund was Lehman Brothers itself. The company had made a $250 million capital commitment. The fund itself was not part of the Lehman bankruptcy estate, but the general partner’s interest, the investment advisor and the $250 capital commitment were involved.

The plaintiffs told the fund they would not make any capital calls after they heard of the Lehman bankruptcy. That was probably a sensible position to take initially.

But the fund emerged from the Lehman bankruptcy proceedings. The existing fund management team would stay in place. A third party capital source funded their purchase of Lehman’s general partner interest and investment adviser. The investor also agreed to assume the unfunded and uncommitted portion of the Lehman’s capital commitment. The management team offered all the limited partners a chance to reduce their capital commitments. Ultimately, the fund reduced in size from $3.3 billion to $2.6 billion.

These three plaintiffs sought a rescission based on three counts: supervening frustration, mutual mistake and violations of the Texas Securities Act.

Supervening frustration

“The doctrine of supervening frustration can be invoked ‘[w]here, after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.’ … The doctrine does not apply if the supervening events were “reasonably foreseeable, and could (and should) have been anticipated by the parties” at the time of contracting.”

The limited partnership agreement contemplated that Lehman might transfer its general partnership interest and the fund would continue to operate. The LP Agreement also contemplated the potential bankruptcy of Lehman.

This claim did not even come close to working.

Mutual mistake

“Under this doctrine, a party can rescind an agreement if (i) both parties were mistaken as to a basic assumption underlying the agreement; (ii) the mistake materially affects the agreed-upon exchange of performances; and (iii) the party adversely affected did not assume the risk of the mistake.”

The plaintiffs claimed they were mistaken about Lehman’s financial condition and the continued presence of Lehman was one of their basic assumptions. The LP agreement contemplated the removal of Lehman. The private placement memorandum made not representations about Lehman’s financial health. The subscription agreement stated that the investors were not relying on any other representations.

This claim did not even come close to working.

Texas Securities Act

“This statute prohibits the soliciting of an investment ‘by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they are made, not misleading.’”

The plaintiffs claimed that Lehman failed to disclose its financial instability. Given this instability, its unlikely Lehman could continue its sponsorship of the fund.

But the false statements were in Lehman’s public filings, not the fund documents. They failed to show that the subscription agreement, the limited partnership agreement or the PPM contained any representation about Lehman’s financial health. They merely pointed to general statements in the PPM about how the fund would benefit in the future from its affiliation with Lehman.

The plaintiffs also failed to allege that the fund knew its representations about Lehman were “false when made.” It failed the scienter requirement under the Texas Securities Act.

It’s tough for a fund to get in a fight with its investors. Here, it was the investors who filed suit. it was probably sensible to resist making capital calls when Lehman filed bankruptcy. Once the fund survived and was spun out with the existing management team, the investors should have re-thought their position.

Sources:

Zubulake Revisited: Six years Later

A new treatise has been written on field of electronic stored information and sanctions for spoliation. In the Amended Opinion and Order for The Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan et al., v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, et al. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York, addressed the issues of parties’ preservation obligations and spoliation in great detail.

The order identified several actions (or failures to act) which would result in a finding of gross negligence in upholding discovery obligations:

“After a discovery duty is well established, the failure to adhere to contemporary standards can be consi-dered gross negligence. Thus, after the final relevant Zubulake opinion in July, 2004, the following failures support a finding of gross negligence, when the duty to preserve has attached:

  • to issue a written litigation hold;
  • to identify all of the key players and to ensure that their electronic and paper records are preserved;
  • to cease the deletion of email or to preserve the records of former employees that are in a party’s possession, custody, or control; and
  • to preserve backup tapes when they are the sole source of relevant information or when they relate to key players, if the relevant information maintained by those players is not obtainable from readily accessible sources.”

The order establishes that sanctions for evidence spoliation require proof that: (i) the party had control over the evidence and an obligation to preserve it at the time it was lost or destroyed; (ii) acted with a culpable state of mind; and (iii) the lost or destroyed evidence was not only relevant to the innocent party’s claims or defenses, but also that party suffered real prejudice as a result.

Sources:

Adriana Linares of LawTech Partners supplied the image: http://www.flickr.com/photos/lawtechpartners/438634521/. Used with permission.

Imposing Caremark Fiduciary Duty on Corporate Officers

I previously posted on the Midland Grange case [Delaware Imposing Same Fiduciary Duty on Officers as Directors] where the Delaware Chancery Court imposed the same obligations on officers as directors, including the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.

In Miller v. McDonald, et al., ( D. Del., Bankr., April 9, 2008), the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled on corporate governance issues related to the fiduciary duties of officers and directors. The Bankruptcy Court denied a motion to dismiss in the course of ruling that Caremark duties would be imposed on an officer (who was not a director), that was on the management team when the President of the company committed fraud and other actions and omissions that ultimately led to the bankruptcy filing of the company.

It is correct that Delaware law does not impose fiduciary duty on “employees” generally, but it is incorrect that it does not impose failure of oversight (fiduciary duty) as to officers. . . . While it is true that all of the cases relied upon by the Trustee involved directors’ conduct, not officers’, I believe the Caremark decision itself suggests that the same test would be applicable to officers.

The corporate entity in Miller v. McDonald is a Florida corporation, so the court is exporting this concept of similar duties between officers and directors from Delaware to Florida.

Thus, it is clear that under both Delaware and Florida law both officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.

Thanks to the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog and Francis G.X. Pileggi of Fox Rothschild LLP and the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog for pointing out this case: Court Imposes Caremark Fiduciary Duty on Corporate Officer.