Tag: Felix Salmon

Financial Illiteracy Found in Study of Financial Literacy

“Understanding the needs of investors is critical to carrying out the Commission’s investor protection mission,” said SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro. Section 917 of Dodd-Frank required the SEC to study the existing level of financial literacy among retail investors. The study was recently released and paints an ugly picture.

Here’s a key quote:

These studies have consistently found that American investors do not understand the most basic financial concepts, such as the time value of money, compound interest and inflation. Investors also lack essential knowledge about more sophisticated concepts, such as the meaning of stocks and bonds; the role of interest rates in the pricing of securities; the function of the stock market; and the value of portfolio diversification…

Perhaps a few decades ago this was less of a problem when big unions were at their most powerful position and big businesses were offering pensions to retirees. With the rapid decline in pensions in favor of 401(k)s and other defined contribution plans, more and more people are responsible for their own investment decisions. It seems they do not have the skills or literacy to do so.

What to do? Neal Lipschutz suggests:

Here’s a modest suggestion: make passing a course in the basics of personal finance a requirement for a high school diploma. You can teach about credit cards, checking accounts, mutual funds and the like. You might even throw in how to vet an investment adviser.

I expect this problem will soon get worse. Private funds will soon be able to start advertising. That means investors that meet the minimal standard of accredited investor will be barraged with opportunities to invest in the once secretive world of hedge funds. That advertising will be limited by the false, misleading or deceptive standard of investment advisers, not by the more strict standards for mutual funds under the Investment Company Act.

I suspect, as does Felix Salmon, that it will not be the excellent funds that advertise. It will be the those that want the flash of the media spotlight.

Private funds will not be held to a uniformity standard allowing potential investors to better compare fund to fund. They’ve gotten accustomed to the relative uniformity with the highly regulated mutual fund products.

It was very obvious that the SEC was not happy with the JOBS Act and is washing its hands of the problems by doing exactly what Congress demanded, and nothing more. At some point there will be a backlash and some additional legislation to deal with the problems that will inevitable arise. Good firms, doing the right thing will likely be subject to further oppressive regulation because of the unrestrained actions of a few bad actors.

Being an accredited investor just means that you have money, not that you understand how to invest your money. I suspect many more will start making bad investments as they hear the siren song of hedge funds.

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The Risk Management Formula That Killed Wall Street

wired-1703Felix Salmon published a great article in Wired that looks at the Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street. The article looks at the widespread use of the Gaussian copula function. In assessing the risks in mortgage backed securities.

The theory behind Gaussian copula function tries to overcome the difficulty in assessing the multitude of  correlations among all the risks in a pool of mortgages. David X. Li came up with the Gaussian copula function that instead of waiting to assemble enough historical data about actual defaults, which are rare in the real world, uses historical prices from the Credit Default Swaps market. Li wrote a model that used the price of Credit Default Swaps, rather than real-world default data as a shortcut to determining the correlation between risks. There is an inherent assumption that the CDS markets can price default risk correctly.

I did not do well in my college statistics class. (It was on Friday afternoon, close to happy hour.) But I do remember two concepts. One, correlation does not equal cause and effect. Two, you always need to challenge the underlying assumptions and methodology, because they can have dramatic effects on the data. (and third, do not schedule difficult classes on Friday afternoon.)

According to Felix’s story, Wall Street seemed to miss some of the underlying assumptions in the Gaussian copula function. Since the risk profile was based on the CDS market, the data was only looked as far back as the CDS market existed. That was less than ten years. During that time, home prices did nothing except skyrocket. Unfortunately, the last real estate crash was before that period.

Li’s formula was used to price hundreds of billions of dollars worth of mortgaged-backed securities. As we now see, Wall Street got it wrong.

It looks like I did not waste my time with statistics and that I got the key knowledge. Look closely at correlation to see why things are moving together. Challenge the underlying assumptions and make sure you understand how they effect the end product of your results. Those are good lessons for anyone involved in enterprise risk management.

The Stanford Fraud

stanford logo

Yesterday, the SEC filed a complaint against R. Allen Stanford and three of his companies: Antiguan-based Stanford International Bank, Houston-based broker-dealer and investment adviser Stanford Group Company, and investment adviser Stanford Capital Management.

Tuesday morning, the Wall Street Journal reported on Stanford Depositors head to Antigua or Redemptions. Word had gotten out that the authorities were investigating the Stanford International Bank and depositors were nervous.

They should have been nervous when they first made the investments. According to item 31 in the SEC complaint, SIB was offering very high rates of return on CDs. On November 28, 2008 SIB was offering a 5.375% rate on a 3 year CD, while other US banks were offering rates under 3.2%. At the same time, SIB was saying the investments were safe and invested in very liquid assets. [Investing 101. The greater the risk the greater the rate of return you should expect.]

Unfortunately it looks like the problem has been in place for years. According to the SEC complaint [item 4] , SIB had identical returns in 1995 and 1996.

Bruce Carton points out that one of Stanford’s own lawyers has emerged as a key figure in the matter: Attorney for Stanford’s “Disaffirmation” of Prior Statements Was Red Flag for SEC. Bruce cites a Bloomberg report that Thomas Sjoblom, a partner at law firm Proskauer Rose doing work for Stanford’s company’s Antigua affiliate, told authorities that he “disaffirmed” everything he had told them to date.

Felix Salmon, of Portfolio.com, first pointed the problems with Stanford International Bank on February 10: What’s Going On at Stanford International Bank? Felix noted that Stanford had very consistent returns that seemed to not be impacted by any of the gyrations of the market over the last few years. Feliz also dug up a report by Alex Dalmady that highlighted the problems.

I see many similarities to the Madoff scheme. The principal was well respected. (Antigua even bestowed knighthood on him.) Investors were promised safety. Investors were shown reasonable, consistent returns. The investment technique was obscure.

Unlike Mr. Madoff, it looks like Mr. Stanford took off in one of his private jets and authorities are still looking for him.

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