It’s been almost a year, but it looks like the SEC is ready to issue its rule on political contributions by investment advisers. They announced the subject matter for the Wednesday June 30 10:00 am open meeting:
The Commission will consider whether to adopt a new rule and related rule amendments under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to address “pay to play” practices by investment advisers. The new rule is designed to prohibit advisers from seeking to influence the award of advisory contracts by public entities by making or soliciting political contributions to or for those officials who are in a position to influence the awards.
Since private equity funds will have to register as investment advisers, the rule will be applicable. Actually, the proposed rule was drafted to be applicable to registered investment advisers or those unregistered in reliance on the exemption under Section 203(b)(3), so it would have been applicable to most private equity funds anyhow.
Back in April, the SEC engaged FINRA to craft rules for registered broker-dealers when acting as a placement agent soliciting investments from government investors. That would make it likely that placement agents will not be banned, but merely subject to some additional regulatory requirements.
The proposed rule limited political contributions to $250 per election per candidate if the contributor is entitled to vote for the candidate. Otherwise, the investment adviser would be subject to a two-year ban on providing advisory services for compensation to that government investor.
Private equity firms gearing up for registration will need to include a policy on political contributions. Next week we will not what need to be in that policy.
In 1972, SEC Chairman William J. Casey appointed a committee to review and evaluate the Commission’s enforcement policies and practices. Chairman Casey appointed John A. Wells, a lawyer at Royall, Koegel & Wells in New York, to the committee. He also added and former SEC Chairmen Manny Cohen and Ralph Demmler. Chairman Casey asked Jack Wells to be the Chairman of the Committee specifically because he was not a securities lawyer,
Thus began what is now knows as the Wells Committee.
The Committee started its work in January 1972, and published a report with forty-three recommendations for the Commission in June of 1972. Of the 43 recommendation in the report, recommendation 7:
“The conduct of an investigation should remain with in the control of the Commission; where circumstances permit, however, the Commission should as a general practice give a party against whom the staff proposes to recommend proceedings an opportunity to present his own version of the facts by affidavit or testimony under oath.”
They further elaborated in the report:
“We recommend that, except where the nature of the case precludes, a prospective defendant or respondent should be notified of the substance of the staff’s charges and probable recommendation in advance of the submission of the staff memorandum to the Commission and be accorded an opportunity to submit a written statement to the staff which would be forwarded to the Commission together with the staff memorandum.”
The “Wells submissions” operate as a last chance for respondents to persuade the SEC staff that an enforcement recommendation is not warranted. If that fails, the Wells submissions are submitted to the Commission, along with a staff recommendation memorandum, so the Commission will have both sides of the story when it considers a recommendation for enforcement.
“In 1970, just months before Chairman Budge left the SEC, the Commission issued a memo to the all division directors and office heads regarding procedures to be followed in enforcement proceedings. The memo had two significant components: (1) it required the staff to get Commission approval before engaging in settlement discussions, and (2) it required the staff to provide a summary of the defendant’s arguments in a recommendation memo sent to the Commission. The latter requirement became a subject of study by the Wells Committee….”
The Wells Committee observed that “[a]s a practical matter, only experienced practitioners who are aware of the opportunity to present their client’s side of the case have made use of [such] procedures.”
Is a Wells Notice Required?
The recommendations of the Wells Committee were met with mixed responses. The Commission apparently felt hamstrung by the mandatory-sounding nature of the phrase “except where the nature of the case precludes.” They did not formally adopt the proposal. In SEC Release No. 5310 the Commission found that it would not be “in the public interest” to adopt a formal rule and instead should give notice on a strictly informal basis. The Commission “cannot place itself in a position where, as a result of the establishment of formal procedural requirements, it would lose its ability to respond to violative activities in a timely fashion.”
identify the specific charges the staff is considering recommending to the Commission
accord the recipient of the Wells notice the opportunity to provide a voluntary statement, in writing or on videotape, arguing why the Commission should not bring an action against them or bringing any facts to the Commission’s attention in connection with its consideration of this matter
set reasonable limitations on the length of any submission made by the recipient (typically, written submissions should be limited to 40 pages, not including exhibits, and video submissions should not exceed 12 minutes), as well as the time period allowed for the recipients to submit a voluntary statement in response to the Wells notice
advise the recipient that any submission should be addressed to the appropriate Assistant Director
inform the recipient that any Wells submission may be used by the Commission in any action or proceeding that it brings and may be discoverable by third parties in accordance with applicable law
attach a copy of the SEC’s Form 1662 (“Supplemental Information for Persons Requested to Supply Information Voluntarily or Directed to Supply Information Pursuant to a Commission Subpoena”)
Sources:
June 1, 1972 Report of the SEC Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices (Wells Committee Report) from the SEC Historical Society
Maybe this would have worked last year. But traders are probably a little nervous when it comes to buying inside information since the Galleon insider trading case. Hedge funds are now well aware that the SEC and FBI are willing to use a broader range of investigation techniques including wire taps and undercover agents.
That’s probably exactly what they were thinking when they got this mysterious email in March 2010:
“Hi, I have access to Disney’s (DIS) quarterly earnings report before its release on 05/03/10 [sic]. I am willing to share this information for a fee that we can determine later. I am sorry but I can’t disclose my identity for confidentiality reasons but we can correspond by email if you would like to discuss it. My email is [email protected]. I count on your discretion as you can count on mine. Thank you and I look forward to talking to you.”
According to the criminal complaint, at least 33 investment firms received the email. It’s not clear which firms alerted the SEC or the FBI.
The FBI sent in “Al Tyson”, a hedge fund trader to discuss the purchase of the inside information. Al was was an undercover FBI agent. The FBI also used undercover agents “Kurt” and “Bill Evers” in separate discussions. There was even a confidential informant for the FBI: “Oscar.”
Bonnie Hoxie worked for Disney as an executive assistant and thought she could get pre-release earnings information. Her boyfriend, Yonni Sebbag sent the emails.
Bonnie and Yonni must not have heard of the Galleon insider trading case. I’m sure the investment firms they contacted have heard of Galleon and I’m sure are extra cautious of insider trading cases. Especially anonymous emails offering to sell inside information.
Compliance week starts off with a Keynote speech from U.S. SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, dubbed “The Enforcement Commissioner” by Compliance Week in March 2009, will provide an update on SEC’s enforcement developments and priorities, including topics such as penalty guidelines and the SEC’s streamlining of the formal order process. Commissioner Aguilar will also explore broader regulatory priorities and the SEC.
(Of course, the statements are his and not necessarily the view of the SEC.)
Its been an interesting year since he gave last year’s keynote at Compliance Week 2009. We have seen breakdowns in the markets and failures that could have been prevented by better and more extensive regulation. Re-regulation was part of the problem and the public expects reform. Wall Street and Main Street are in a struggle over regulation, with Wall Street making the loudest statements and are better connected.
He does not lay the blame solely on Wall Street. The legislature and regulators have to accept some of the blame for not reigning in the exotic financial transaction. He put forth four themes:
Regulatory oversight is piecemeal.
The SEC needs a real-time transparent view into the markets.
The regulations need to revisit the concept of the “sophisticated investor.”
We must remember the crucial role that the SEC plays in rigorous oversight.
He spent some time using the Flash-Crash on May 6 as an example of the problems. There was a significant failure and still, weeks later, we don’t understand what happened or how to prevent it.
He is looking forward to the self-funding mechanism in the Dodd bill to escape the perennial funding shortfall at the SEC.
by Francine McKenna
He thinks the approach to the “sophisticated investor” is short-sighted. Even these investors need transparency and full disclosure. Since these institutional investors are often just an aggregation of small investors, therefore having a huge impact on small investors. A pension fund may have billions in assets, but those assets reflect the retirement savings of its workers.
He wants to focus on effective deterrence, by scaring people with the possibility of sanctions. “I do not want that to happen to me.” That means harsher sanctions, more individual sanctions, and more money penalties (not merely disgorgement). Crime should not pay.
“Corporate penalties come out of the shareholders pocket.” He dismisses that concept. Management controls how money is spent. He thinks lots of that penalty would go to bonuses. He threw out the idea of SEC penalties coming out of the bonus pool for the company.
He thinks insider trading penalties should not be merely disgorgement plus a penalty equal to a disgorgement. He thinks the SEC should set penalties at the maximum under the statute: 3X.
He is also looking for stronger de-debarment powers to kick bad actors out of the securities industry and out of the management of public companies.
One question was about the PCAOB case in the Supreme Court. He said the SEC has some contingency plans (he chose not to disclose), but recognizes that it will be up to Congress to change the law.
The SEC censured and fined an investment adviser for due diligence lapses. Yosemite Capital Management, LLC and its managing director, Paul H. Heckler, got a wrist slap for failing to disclose to clients that they had encountered substantial problems when attempting to perform the due diligence.
The big problem is that Yosemite had made a promise to at least two clients prior to placing his clients into the investment. They had promised to conduct due diligence. We saw a similar action by the SEC against the Hennessee Group for their failure to conduct their promised due diligence.
Yosemite ended up putting their clients’ money into a Ponzi scheme. Yosemite placed $3.25 million of four clients’ funds through a feeder fund, Ashton Investments LLC which was supposed to make bridge loans arranged by Norman Hsu and Next Components, Ltd. Heckler’s clients’ funds became part of a Hsu’s $60 million Ponzi scheme.
Yosemite missed some bright red flags:
The business cards from Ashton’s representatives that listed their position as “Represenative” [sic].
Ashton gave Yosemite a brochure riddled with spelling errors and mostly general, unverified information.
In addition to the business cards and the brochure, the only other written information concerning Ashton and Hsu that Yosemite received were emails, without any identifying information, that summarized a few of the loans.
Heckler was told that he could not contact Hsu’s lawyers or accountants because Hsu was a private person.
Heckler was told that the bridge loans were safer than stocks or bonds.
When Heckler requested a disclaimer in the loan agreement, he was told that it was unnecessary because the investment was not risky.
Because Ashton had no offices, Heckler met the Ashton representatives at local restaurants to discuss the investment.
Heckler and Yosemite willfully violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act, which prohibits any investment adviser from engaging in any transaction, practice, or course of business, which operates as a fraud or deceit on any client or prospective client, and Heckler caused Yosemite’s violations of Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act.
The “wrist slap” was a disgorgement of the fee earned ($26,000), prejudgment interest and a $50,000 fine. Heckler invested $275,000 of his own money in the scheme and lost $150,000 of it.
Of the $3.25 million of the clients’ money invested, they lost $1.95 million when Hsu’s Ponzi scheme collapsed.
At issue, according to the Moody’s filing, is the determination in 2007 that members of one of its European rating committees “engaged in conduct contrary to Moody’s Code of Professional Conduct.” Members of a credit committee knew that some of the products had been given inflated ratings because of a problem in the company’s risk modeling software.
The disclosure in Moody’s 10-Q states that the SEC “is considering recommending that the SEC institute administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against MIS in connection with MIS’s initial June 2007 application on SEC Form NRSRO to register as a nationally recognized statistical rating organization under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.” The theory is that Moody’s description of its procedures and principles were “rendered false and misleading” as of the time the application because of the Company’s finding that a rating committee policy had been violated.
The case reminds me of the Hennessee Group action where the SEC brought an action against a hedge fund for failing to conduct adequate diligence. The reason was that the hedge fund claimed that they had a particular due diligence program, but failed to follow the program. The diligence failure by itself was not actionable, but failing to live up to your self-professed standards made it actionable.
It sounds the SEC is making a similar case against Moody’s. In their application, they claimed to have a certain procedure but failed to follow it. We all know that credit agencies did a poor job of rating CDOs. That by itself caused damages but may not be actionable. So the SEC is going after them for failing to follow their own self-professed standards and policies.
It’s too early to tell what may happen. A worst case scenario would be removing Moody’s status as a NRSRO. Obviously that would be a nuclear option that would destroy the company. The SEC action sounds like it is related to Moody’s ratings of just one type credit product, so the effects might be minimal.
Will the SEC go after the other rating agencies? or will Moody’s be the sacrificial lamb to warn the others?
Rob Kaplan and Bruce Karpati, co-chiefs of the Asset Management Unit of the SEC enforcement division, held their first full staff meeting last week. This new unit will be focusing on misbehavior by private-equity funds, hedge funds, buyout firms, mutual funds and other asset managers. The unit is one of the five specialty units the SEC formed earlier this year.
Side Pockets
Hedge funds use side pockets to protect new investments, long term investments and other assets that they do not want to liquidate in the face of redemptions in the fund. In the Great Panic of 2008 funds used side pockets to limit redemption.
Valuations
One issue related to the side pocket is valuation of the assets. One reason for keeping the assets is because the fund managers feel the assets are not being properly valued in the market. On the bad side, the fund may be charging fees against the inflated value of those side pockets assets. Most side pocket assets are illiquid, which makes valuations difficult to determine.
Management Investment
One surprising priority for the unit is evaluating whether fund managers really have their own wealth invested in the fund when they are saying so in the prospectus and marketing materials.
It sounds like some enforcement proceedings are likely to appear in this area in the next few months.
The SEC has named its first chief compliance officer: Kathleen Griffin.
She will be tasked with oversight of employee securities transactions and financial disclosure reporting. The creation of a compliance program to prevent insider trading came from last year’s insider trading scandal at the SEC. The Office of the Inspector General reported that “the Commission lacks any true compliance system to monitor SEC employees’ securities transactions and detect insider trading.”
Ms. Griffin will have her hands full. From the SEC OIG Report:
The current disclosure requirements and compliance system are based on the honor system. and there is no way to determine if an employee fails to report a securities transaction. There are no spot checks conducted and the SEC does not obtain duplicate brokerage account statements. In addition. there is little to no oversight or check;ing of the reports that employees file to determine their accuracy or even whether an employee has reported at all. Moreover. different SEC offices receive each of those reports and do not routinely share that information with each other.
It’s good to see the SEC drinking its own champagne and hiring someone to focus on their own internal compliance issues. (Doesn’t “drinks its own champagne” sound better than “eat its own dog food.”)
Since the announcement came on April 1, I thought it was an April Fool’s Day joke. Why would the SEC hire the comedian Kathy Griffin? Clearly, I was being overly cautious about my news intake. I was not alone in this confusion and I’m sure will not be the last to draw the comparison between the two.
The First Circuit threw out the SEC’s 10b-5(b) claim in SEC v. Tambone. This time it was the entire court after an earlier decision of a three judge panel reached the opposite decision.
The SEC alleged that James Tambone and Robert Hussey engaged in fraud in connection with the sale of mutual fund shares tied to market timing claims. The two were senior executives of a registered broker dealer, Columbia Funds Distributor, Inc. The prospectuses for the funds told investors that market timing was not permitted. Unfortunately, Tambone and Hussey permitted a number of customers to engage in market timing transactions. The SEC took the position that Tambone and Hussey were responsible for the false statements in the prospectuses since they commented on the market timing passages prior to their inclusion in the documents.
This case presents the two-part question of whether a securities professional can be said to “make” a statement, such that liability under Rule 10b-5(b) may attach, either by (i) using statements to sell securities, regardless of whether those statements were crafted entirely by others, or (ii) directing the offering and sale of securities on behalf of an underwriter, thus making an implied statement that he has a reasonable basis to believe that the key representations in the relevant prospectus are truthful and complete. The answer to each part of this two-part question is “no.”
Rule 10b-5(b), promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, renders it unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
The Tambone case turns on the meaning of the word “make” as used in Rule 10b-5(b). The SEC advocated “an expansive definition, contending that one may “make” a statement within the purview of the rule by merely using or disseminating a statement without regard to the authorship of that statement or, in the alternative, that securities professionals who direct the offering and sale of shares on behalf of an underwriter impliedly “make” a statement, covered by the rule, to the effect that the disclosures in a prospectus are truthful and complete.”
The court rejected the SEC’s position.
In 1994 the US Supreme Court held that private civil liability does not an aiding and abetting suit under Rule 10b-5 in the case of Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164. So private parties can only bring a suit against primary violators of Rule 10b-5. As a result of that decision, Congress amended the Exchange Act to make it clear that the SEC can bring a suit againstanyone who provides substantial assistance to a primary violator of securities laws. That is, the SEC can impose secondary liability.
The First Circuit decided that the SEC was trying to impose primary liability on Tambone and Hussey for conduct that would be a secondary violation (at most). The Court acknowledged that there is a split in the courts over the right test, but held that the facts of this case would fail both tests.
“If Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable [as a primary violator] under section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting.” Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997).
The next step is up to the SEC. They need to decide if they will appeal to the Supreme Court and use this case to try to reconcile the law in this area.
