The SEC Continues to Investigate Side Pockets and Valuations

The SEC brought another case against a private investment fund for misuse of side pockets. Lawrence R. Goldfarb of Baystar Capital Management agreed to pay a hefty fine to settle claims brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission for misuse of his investment fund’s assets.

When used properly, a side pocket is a mechanism that a hedge fund uses to separate illiquid investments from the liquid investments. If a fund investor redeems their investment in a hedge fund with a side pocket, the investor cannot redeem the pro-rata portion of their investment allocated to the side pocket. That portion of the redemption is delayed until the asset is liquidated or is released from the side pocket. It’s a way to protect all of the investors when the fund has a big chunk of illiquid assets. A wave of redemptions would force the sale of liquid assets, leaving those who did not redeem with the illiquid assets.

The typical abuse is to hide under-performing assets from limited partner scrutiny. The manager still collects the management fee on the over-valued assets. Without recognizing the loss, partners are less likely to redeem their capital.

The SEC complaint alleges that Goldfarb acted even more egregiously than disguising valuations. He stole profits from the fund.

The complaint states that Goldfarb’s fund invested in a real estate partnership. Since that investment was likely a very illiquid asset it would typically end up in a side pocket. Shortly after the investment was made the real estate partnership started making cash distributions. Goldfarb has these distributions sent to him instead of the investment fund. He ended up transferring the whole interest to himself, using the side pocket to hide the asset and the distributions.

At first I thought this might be an interesting action to highlight Rule 206(4)-8. From the complaint, is sounds more like a case of blatant theft from the fund. This enforcement actions shows that the SEC is focusing on private funds, valuations, side pockets and affiliate transactions.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Goldfarb and Baystar Capital Management consented to permanent injunctions against violations of certain provisions of the federal securities laws and to pay disgorgement of $12,112,416 and prejudgment interest of $1,967,371, which will be distributed to the fund’s investors. Goldfarb also agreed to pay a $130,000 penalty, be barred from associating with any investment adviser or broker (with the right to reapply in five years), and be barred from participating in any offering of penny stock.

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Incentive Compensation Limitations and Disclosures for Private Fund Managers

At the Wednesday March 2 Open Meeting, the Securities and Exchange Commission voted to approve a new rule that would affect incentive compensation paid to employees of investment advisers and broker-dealers. Commissioners Casey and Paredes voted against proposing the rule as drafted. The other three voted to move the proposed rule into the comment period.

Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires federal regulators to

“prescribe regulations or guidelines to require each covered financial institution to disclose to the appropriate Federal regulator the structures of all incentive-based compensation arrangements offered by such covered financial institutions sufficient to determine whether the compensation structure:

(A) provides an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of the bank holding company with covered financial institution with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or

(B) could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution.”

A “covered financial institution” includes investment advisers (as defined under section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act), a broker-dealer registered under section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as banks, credit unions, FNMA, FHLMC and others designated by regulators, with assets of $1 billion of more.

If you are a private fund manager and have assets of $1 billion or more under management, then this rule would affect you. As drafted the rule applies if you are an investment adviser, regardless of whether you are registered with the SEC as an investment adviser.

Some real estate fund managers are still looking for exemptions for registering with the SEC or registering with the state based on the securities calculation, or by taking the position that they are not a “private fund” under the SEC’s definition. The choice of registration would not affect the applicability of this proposed rule.

This is a joint rulemaking so there needs to be some consistency across financial institutions. A draft of the proposal was published by the FDIC (pdf).

Only incentive-based compensation paid to “covered persons” would be subject to the requirements of this Proposed Rule. A “covered person” would be any executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of a covered financial institution.

The proposed rule defines “incentive-based compensation” to mean any variable compensation that serves as an incentive for performance. It excludes fixed salary.

The first requirement is that a covered financial institution must submit an annual report “disclosing the structure of its incentive-based compensation arrangements that is sufficient to determine whether the incentive-based compensation structure provides covered employees with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits, or could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution.” The report must contain:

(1) A clear narrative description of the components of the covered financial institution’s incentive-based compensation arrangements applicable to covered persons and specifying the types of covered persons to which they apply;

(2) A succinct description of the covered financial institution’s policies and procedures governing its incentive-based compensation arrangements;

(3) For larger covered financial institutions, a succinct description of any specific incentive compensation policies and procedures for the institution’s executive officers, and other covered persons who the board or a committee thereof determines individually have the ability to expose the institution to possible losses that are substantial in relation to the institution’s size, capital, or overall risk tolerance;

(4) Any material changes to the covered financial institution’s incentive-based compensation arrangements and policies and procedures made since the covered financial institution’s last report was submitted; and

(5) The specific reasons the covered financial institution believes the structure of its incentive-based compensation plan does not provide covered persons incentives to engage in behavior that is likely to cause the covered financial institution to suffer a material financial loss, and does not provide covered persons with excessive compensation.

Under the SEC proposal, there would be a mandatory deferral of incentive compensation for employees of large financial institutions (over $50 billion). At least 50% of the incentive compensation must be paid over three years. It sounded like this deferral requirement was the point most disliked by the two dissenting commissioners.

This is a fairly ugly rule for private equity funds and real estate funds. Incentive compensation is usually paid upon the realization of the assets.

Under Dodd-Frank, the rule is required to be in place 9 months after enactment. That would mean an April 21, 2011 deadline.

SEC Is Serious About Expert Networks and Gets a New Logo

The Securities and Exchange Commission charged a hedge fund and four hedge fund portfolio managers and analysts with illegally traded on confidential information obtained from technology company employees moonlighting as expert network consultants.

Even bigger news is that the SEC came up with this fancy new logo to brand its expert network investigations and prosecutions.

“It is illegal for company insiders who moonlight as consultants to sell confidential information about their companies to traders, and it is equally illegal to buy that corruptly obtained information and trade on it,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.

Expert networks are not inherently illegal. Of course it’s legal to obtain advice and analysis through experts. It becomes illegal to trade when that material nonpublic information is obtained in violation of a duty to keep that information confidential.

It would be perfectly legal to have someone look at the traffic count for a store to use as a measure of whether sales are up or down. Legend has it that some investors used satellite photos of Wal-Mart parking lots to help with their earnings estimates.

In this case, the SEC is accusing the experts of leveraging insiders to reveal sales forecasts, revenues, and other detailed inside information about their companies. There will be questions about the information: is it material nonpublic information? and did the parties have a duty to keep the information confidential?

The cases should be interesting as an evolution of insider trading prosecutions. The new logo just makes it more interesting.

Thanks to Dominic Jones of IR Web Report for pointing out the new logo in one of his Twitter updates.

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The SEC, Funding, and Rulemaking

There is turmoil in Congress as Republicans take control of the House of Representatives. One of their targets seems to be implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

It’s probably too late to repeal it and too early to start amending it. Too much corporate machinery has been put in place to start changing the statute at this point. It looks like Congress is going to use its control of spending to impede implementation and enforcement.

The SEC has asked for more funding and submitted a budget request of $1.258 billion for fiscal 2011. That was up from the previous year’s $1.118 billion budget. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro said the agency would need to hire an additional 800 people to meet its expanded duties under Dodd-Frank.

Clearly, SEC will be stretched thin to deal with rule-making, enforcement, and examination if they are starved for budget dollars. More dollars means more staff and more technology to deal with the workload.

We have already seen that the SEC has missed its proposed deadlines in its rulemaking agenda and others have been explicitly delayed because of budget uncertainty.The most high-profile stalled effort is the proposed new Whistleblower office. Dodd-Frank imposed a heavy rule-making agenda on the SEC. They are likely to continue missing deadlines without the manpower and budget.

For corporate compliance, that means uncertainty about how Dodd-Frank will be implemented. If you are in a venture capital firm, you are wondering if you will have to register with the SEC as an investment adviser. There is proposed rule with the definition. There is a proposed rule with what reporting the venture capital firm will need to make. But you don’t know exactly where the definitions and rules will end up.

If you are a private fund adviser, you know you will need to file a Form ADV. The SEC has proposed a new form. It’s too early to start filling it out, because it may change. They will still need to change the online registration system to address whatever the final form will be.

We are now in 2011. That July 21, 2011 compliance deadline is getting closer and closer, but the SEC is falling further and further behind.

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Can I Be a Venture Capital Fund Manager?

That was one of the topics for the Securities and Exchange Commission Open Meeting on November 19.

In Shapiro’s opening remarks, it was clear that the SEC wants all private funds to register. Even thought venture capital funds are exempt from registration, they will need to supply information to the SEC.

The key in defining “venture capital” will be the lack of leverage in the funds and the non-public status of their investments.

They will not have to disclose the full panoply of information that is required by Part 2 of Form ADV. So they will not have to disclose compensation and conflict information.

The SEC has only been able to examine 10% of registered investment advisers each year.

They made it clear that private fund advisers will not be excluded from the “systemically important” label under Dodd-Frank. Big advisers will need to keep an eye on this rulemaking, scheduled to be released in January.

Then on to the specifics.

There are proposed changes to Form ADV to reflect the new thresholds for registration and some other changes. private funds will need to disclose key gatekeepers such as auditors and third-party marketers.

They will also include information for the venture capital funds that have to report, but not register. These exempt-reporting advisers will still be using Form-ADV. They will need to disclose information about ownership, fund structures, and disciplinary activity.

As for venture capital funds, it seemed clear that they struggled trying to come up with a definition of a “venture capital fund.” The definition in the proposed rule will include these limitations:

  • must get 80% of the shares directly from the company
  • investments must be in a private company
  • provide significant management assistance to the company
  • only borrow a portion of their fund’s capital
  • limited redemption rights to limited partners
  • self-label as a venture capital fund

They will allow a grandfathering for venture capital funds, giving them some time to restructure to fall under the definition. That should be a relief for fund wondering how they can meet the July 21, 2011 deadline and not take a hit on their illiquid investments.

Commissioner Casey did not like the approach of the rule on venture capital funds and Form ADV. She noted that the statute is ambiguous on the reporting requirements and thinks the rule is putting too much of a burden on venture capital funds.

(I missed Commissioner Walter’s remarks.)

Commissioner Aguilar focused on the valuation and leverage discussions for funds. He seemed to really be interested in having such a big database of information about private fund advisers.

Commissioner Paredes focused on the insertion of the venture capital exemption outside of the Section 203 exemptions.  To him that means they are subject to much more oversight and subject to examination. He is concerned about the distraction of the fund mangers from growing small companies. He seemed skeptical that the regulatory oversight will help investors. He was concerned about the requirement of “providing managerial assistance” and how that may affect a VC investor that does not get a board seat. He realizes that the SEC is stuck with the statutory framework enacted by Congress. (I guess that’s the problem with getting an exemption tacked on to the bill instead of a thoughtful reworking of the regulatory framework.)

As usual with the SEC, the actual text of the rules was not released as part of the meeting and we will have to wait to see the details. Of course, these are just proposed rules so there will be an opportunity to comment and the SEC may make some changes to the rules based on the comments.

Securities and Exchange Commission’s FY 2010 Performance and Accountability Report

In June 2010, the SEC approved a new strategic plan for its fiscal years 2010 – FY 2015. The plan set out the agency’s mission, vision, values, and strategic goals. It also had a detailed list the outcomes the SEC wanted to achieve and the performance measures that will be used to gauge the agency’s progress.

The SEC has released its 2010 Performance and Accountability Report, the first to measure the SEC performance against its strategic plan.

I thought it would be useful to look at some portions of the report to see if it could offer some insight into what to expect from the SEC as real estate private equity moves into the SEC registration regime.

The first that caught my eye was GoalL 1 Measure 3: Percentage of firms receiving deficiency letters that take corrective action in response to all exam findings.

The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations missed its target of 95%, achieving only 90%. This was a drop from 94% in FY2009. I’m not sure what factors I would attribute to the decrease. Were the examinees less afraid of SEC action?

This is one that compliance professionals need to focus on. If the SEC identifies deficiencies, you need to fix them. Failure to fix them is a big red flag that could move the problem from OCIE to enforcement.

On the education side, the SEC’s CCOutreach program failed to meet its goal of having attendees rate the program as “useful” or “extremely useful.”

I attended a 2009 edition of CCOutreach in Boston and it was excellent. Looking back at my notes, it was a spot-on roadmap for the upcoming SEC initiatives. I still hate the name.

I think it’s worth spending some time to look through the report. I would guess that the SEC is going to step up its efforts in areas where it failed to meed the goals in its strategic plan.

That would mean more inspections, more enforcement actions. It will also mean more educational efforts and quicker resolution. One measure is the percentage of non-sweep and non-cause exams concluded in 120 days. The goal was 75%, but they only achieved 48%.

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SEC to Consider New Rules for Fund Managers

On Friday, The Securities and Exchange Commission will be considering rules that should be of interest to private investment fund managers.

It looks like we may have the first look at how the SEC will define a venture capital fund and who will fit into that new exemption to registration under the Investment Advisers Act. Section 407 of Dodd-Frank puts the onus on the SEC to define ‘venture capital fund.’

My guess is that the definition will be very narrow and many venture capital fund managers will not be happy with the definition.

Open Meeting – Friday, November 19, 2010 – 10:00 a.m.

The subject matter of the Open Meeting will be:

  • The Commission will consider whether to propose new rules and rule amendments under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to implement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. These rules and rule amendments are designed to give effect to provisions of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act that, among other things, increase the statutory threshold for registration by investment advisers with the Commission, require advisers to hedge funds and other private funds to register with the Commission, and address reporting by certain investment advisers that are exempt from registration.
  • The Commission will consider whether to propose rules that would implement new exemptions from the registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 for advisers to venture capital funds and advisers with less than $150 million in private fund assets under management in the United States. These exemptions were enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The proposed rules also would clarify the meaning of certain terms included in a new exemption for foreign private advisers.
  • The Commission will consider whether to propose new rules under Section 763(i) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act governing the security-based swap data repository registration process, the duties of such repositories, and the core principles applicable to such repositories.
  • The Commission will consider whether to propose Regulation SBSR under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to provide for the reporting of security-based swap information to registered security-based swap data repositories or the Commission and the public dissemination of security-based swap transaction, volume, and pricing information.

At times, changes in Commission priorities require alterations in the scheduling of meeting items. For further information and to ascertain what, if any, matters have been added, deleted or postponed, please contact: The Office of the Secretary at (202) 551-5400.

Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions From Dodd-Frank

The SEC has released the text of its proposed new rules for implementing the whistleblower provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Release No. 34-63237.

In fashioning these proposed rules, the Commission has considered and weighed a number of potentially competing interests that are presented in implementing the statute. Among them was the potential for the monetary incentives provided to whistleblowers by Section 21F of the Exchange Act to reduce the effectiveness of a company’s existing compliance, legal, audit and similar internal processes for investigating and responding to potential violations of the federal securities laws. With this possible tension in mind, we have included provisions in the proposed rules intended not to discourage whistleblowers who work for companies that have robust compliance programs to first report the violation to appropriate company personnel, while at the same time preserving the whistleblower’s status as an original source of the information and eligibility for an award. At the same time, the proposed rules would not prohibit a whistleblower in a compliance function from reporting information to the Commission where the company did not provide the information to the Commission within a reasonable time or acted in bad faith.

At this point, it is merely a proposed rule. Comments should be submitted on or before December 17, 2010.

There will be a new Form TCR for submitting a tip, complaint or referral and a new Form WB-DEC, Declaration Concerning Original Information Provided Pursuant to §21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, signed under penalty of perjury, for submission to the SEC to meet the standards of the new regulations.

SEC Complaint Reads Like a List of Things Not to Do

SEC complaints usually contain great stories about what you should not to do. A recent case involving PEF Advisors caught my eye. The SEC claimed that hedge fund managers Paul Mannion, and Andrew Reckles, and their investment advisory company PEF Advisors misappropriated investor cash and securities by using the “side pockets” in 2005.

When used properly, a side pocket is a mechanism that a hedge fund uses to separate illiquid investments from the liquid investments. If a fund investor redeems their investment in a hedge fund with a side pocket, the investor cannot redeem the pro-rata portion of their investment allocated to the side pocket. That portion of the redemption is delayed until the asset is liquidated or is released from the side pocket. It’s a way to protect all of the investors when the fund has a big chunk of illiquid assets. A wave of redemptions would force the sale of liquid assets, leaving those who did not redeem with the illiquid assets.

Side pockets can be abused by putting liquid investments aside to limit the damage from redemptions. That is one of the many claims by the SEC against PEF.

Stavroula Lambrakopoulos, a lawyer who represents the defendants, said her clients “strongly deny the allegations in the complaint.” Whether they are true or not, the complaint lays out a list of things you should not do.

  • Do not sell securities from your personal account while having the fund invest in that security.
  • Do not violate your valuation policy.
  • Do not overvalue assets that you know are worthless.
  • Do not dramatically overvalue assets to increase your management fee.
  • Do not exercise the fund’s warrants in your personal account.
  • Do not borrow from the fund to make personal investments.
  • Do not trade on material non-public information when you have agreed to keep the information confidential.
  • Do not sign agreement stating that you do “not hold a short position, directly or indirectly, in” a stock when you shorted the shares the prior week.

The SEC brought claims under 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 206 (1) of the Advisers Act, and 206 (2) of the Advisers Act. There were lots of bad acts in the complaint, but the press release emphasized the side pocket problems.

Back in April, the SEC Enforcement Division’s new asset management unit announced that they were looking at ‘side pocket’ arrangements. This is the first case I’ve seen focused on this issue. I expect we will see some more soon.

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The Family Office Exemption under the Investment Advisers Act

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act wiped out the exemption enjoyed by most private funds. I’m still waiting to see how the SEC will define a “venture capital fund manager.” In the meantime, the SEC has published its proposed rule defining a “family office” and its exemption from registration under the Investment Advisers Act.

Historically, family offices have not been required to register with the SEC under the Advisers Act because of the same exemption used by private funds. The Dodd-Frank Act removed that “small adviser” exemption under section 203(b)(3) to enable the SEC to regulate hedge fund and other private fund advisers, but includes a new provision requiring the SEC to define family offices in order to exempt them from regulation under the Advisers Act.

“Family offices” are established by wealthy families to manage their wealth and provide other services to family members. That leaves the fabulously wealthy time to go yachting and leaves others to manage their securities portfolios, plan for taxes, worry about accounting services, and to directing charitable giving. The issue is the the family office management of securities.

In the past, the SEC has issued dozens of exemptive orders for family offices who requested them, removing them from the registration and supervision of the SEC. The proposed rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1 would largely codify the exemptive orders. Most of the conditions of the proposed rule are designed to restrict the structure and operation of a family office relying on the exemption to activities unlikely to involve commercial advisory activities, while still allowing family office activities involving charities, tax planning, and pooled investing.

(b) Family office. A family office is a company (including its directors, partners, trustees, and employees acting within the scope of their position or employment) that:

(1) Has no clients other than family clients; provided that if a person that is not a family client becomes a client of the family office as a result of the death of a family member or key employee or other involuntary transfer from a family member or key employee, that person shall be deemed to be a family client for purposes of this section 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1 for four months following the transfer of assets resulting from the involuntary event;

(2) Is wholly owned and controlled (directly or indirectly) by family members; and

(3) Does not hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser.

The key is how the SEC defines a family member:

(d) (3) Family member means:

(i) the founders, their lineal descendants (including by adoption and stepchildren), and such lineal descendants’ spouses or spousal equivalents;

(ii) the parents of the founders; and

(iii) the siblings of the founders and such siblings’ spouses or spousal equivalents and their lineal descendants (including by adoption and stepchildren) and such lineal descendants’ spouses or spousal equivalents.

I guess that some family offices will be cutting off some distant relations to get under this definition. For “less-beloved” family members, the family office management can use SEC regulation as an excuse to kick them out.  Of course, they can still seek and exemptive order from the SEC if they don’t fit under this definition.

The comments should involve a whole new area for the SEC: family law.

As I expected, this exemption is of no value to private funds look for a safe harbor from SEC registration.

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