SEC Extends Deadline and Adopts Rules for Advisers and Private Funds

At an open meeting on June 22, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted new rules under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 aimed at investment advisers, private fund managers, venture capital funds, and family offices.

Based on the statements at the meeting, there will be three new rules would:

Delay Registration Deadline and a New Form ADV. The new registration/reporting deadline for new Advisers Act registrants and “exempt reporting advisers” will be March 30, 2012. Previously exempt private advisers, particularly those to hedge funds and private equity funds, will not be required to register until March 30, 2012. All advisers will be required to make a filing in the first quarter of 2012. Those previously registered advisers who no longer qualify for SEC registration will be required to withdraw by June 28, 2012.

The SEC staff pointed out that 2012 is a leap year, so the 90 day deadline is March 30 instead of March 31 in 2012.

Form ADV is going to change. No surprise. Under the amended adviser registration form, advisers to private funds will have to provide:

  • Basic organizational and operational information about each fund they manage, such as the type of private fund that it is (e.g., hedge fund, private equity fund, or liquidity fund), general information about the size and ownership of the fund, general fund data, and the adviser’s services to the fund.
  • Identification of five categories of “gatekeepers” that perform critical roles for advisers and the private funds they manage (i.e., auditors, prime brokers, custodians, administrators and marketers).
  • More information about conflicting or potential conflicting relationships.

Define Venture Capital Funds. Under the definition, a venture capital fund is a private fund that:

  • Invests primarily in “qualifying investments” (generally, private, operating companies that do not distribute proceeds from debt financings in exchange for the fund’s investment in the company); may invest in a “basket” of non-qualifying investments of up to 20 percent of its committed capital; and may hold certain short-term investments.
  • Is not leveraged except for a minimal amount on a short-term basis. Borrowing is limited in time as well.
  • Does not offer redemption rights to its investors.
  • Represents itself to investors as pursuing a venture capital strategy.
  • Is not registered under the Investment Company Act.

There will be a rule on grandfathering substantially as proposed in November, with the three conditions that the fund had been represented to be a “venture capital fund,” that the first closing was prior to December 31, 2010 and that no new capital commitments are made after July 21, 2011.

The new category of venture capital fund advisers and other “exempt reporting advisers” will file portions of Part 1 of Form ADV. Commissioner Schapiro noted that there was no current intention to subject exempt reporting advisers to routine examinations, while also noting that the SEC retains the authority to examine those advisers in its discretion. The Staff noted that the Form ADV will include a uniform calculation for “assets under management.”

Family Office Exemption. This exemption should be consistent with no-action relief previously provided and the proposed rule. It sounds like there will be some expansion to address a broader universe of permitted family clients and ta longer transition period (through December 31, 2013) for the termination of relationships with charitable entities that were not exclusively funded by the family.

These rules will have completed most of the rulemaking required under Title IV of Dodd-Frank, the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act.

My printer is still cranking out the text of the new rules and I need to dive deeper into the details.

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Sometimes You Get Stuck and Can’t Get Out

Finally, the SEC is going to take some action today on the regulation of investment advisers, venture capital funds, and private fund managers.

For years, they’ve been trying to get regulatory control of private funds. Now they are going to get it.

Do they really want it?

Sometimes what you want to do is not a good a choice. As a case in point, I give you a kitten crawling inside a hamster ball.

Sure it’s cute. But you end up with a pissed-off kitten.

The Open Meeting for June 22 is all about the Investment Advisers Act.

Agenda:

Item 1: The Commission will consider whether to adopt new rules and rule amendments under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to implement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. These rules and rule amendments are designed to give effect to provisions of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act that, among other things, increase the statutory threshold for registration of investment advisers with the Commission, require advisers to hedge funds and other private funds to register with the Commission, and address reporting by certain investment advisers that are exempt from registration.

Item 2: The Commission will consider whether to adopt rules that would implement new exemptions from the registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 for advisers to venture capital funds and advisers with less than $150 million in private fund assets under management in the United States. These exemptions were enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The new rules also would clarify the meaning of certain terms included in a new exemption for foreign private advisers.

Item 3: The Commission will consider whether to adopt a rule defining “family offices” that will be excluded from the definition of an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

The word I’ve heard is that the July 21, 2011 deadline will be extended to March 31, 2012.

Be Mindful of Compliance Costs

That story is title does not come from me; it’s a quote from  Commissioner Troy A. Paredes of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

We cannot simply focus on the costs and benefits of a single rule change on a stand-alone basis. It is the totality of the regulatory infrastructure that impacts the private sector. As part of this analysis, we need to be mindful of compliance costs. It is costly for firms to comply with the regulatory obligations they confront both in terms of out-of-pocket expenditures, as well as the opportunity cost of the time and effort of personnel that could have been directed toward other productive endeavors. Indeed, the compliance burden on investment advisers has increased of late due to, for example, the need to comply with the new “pay-to-play” rule restricting political contributions; the recent amendments to Part 2 of Form ADV concerning the preparation and delivery of a “brochure” and “brochure supplements” to advisory clients; and the recent amendments to the custody rule.

The Commissioner was giving a speech to the Hedge Fund Regulation and Current Developments symposium at the Center for Law, Economics & Finance at the The George Washington University Law School on June 8.

There was lots of blame thrown at the hedge fund industry after the financial crisis of 2008 with very little data to support the accusations.  Commissioner Parades also addressed this point:

Regulatory decision making should be supported by data, to the extent available, and economic analysis. This is particularly important to stress insofar as the SEC is concerned, because the SEC is an agency that traditionally has overwhelmingly been comprised of lawyers. Empirical analysis must be much more central to decision making at the SEC than has been the case.

Commissioner Parades is just one of five commissioners, so his position is not necessarily a controlling influence. But it’s still good to see that at least part of the SEC is focusing on there being better regulatory, not just more regulatory control

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Finally, Some SEC Action on the July 21 Deadline for Fund Managers

If you’re a private fund manager you have been worried about the looming July 21 deadline for registration. Given the 45 day review period, the filing deadline was June 6. That came and went without the SEC having the rules in place for registration. Sure, the SEC commissioners and staff have been saying the plan to extend the deadline. But, still no extension.

Looking ahead to June 22, it looks like the SEC will finally take up the formal action. The Open Meeting for June 22 is all about the Investment Advisers Act.

Agenda:

Item 1: The Commission will consider whether to adopt new rules and rule amendments under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to implement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. These rules and rule amendments are designed to give effect to provisions of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act that, among other things, increase the statutory threshold for registration of investment advisers with the Commission, require advisers to hedge funds and other private funds to register with the Commission, and address reporting by certain investment advisers that are exempt from registration.

Item 2: The Commission will consider whether to adopt rules that would implement new exemptions from the registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 for advisers to venture capital funds and advisers with less than $150 million in private fund assets under management in the United States. These exemptions were enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The new rules also would clarify the meaning of certain terms included in a new exemption for foreign private advisers.

Item 3: The Commission will consider whether to adopt a rule defining “family offices” that will be excluded from the definition of an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

Hopefully, they won’t change their mind about extending the deadline.

Felons and Fund Managers

Most private funds rely on a Rule 506 exemption under Regulation D to sell their limited partnership interests to investors. A new SEC rule amending Rule 506 should catch the eye of private fund compliance officers. The concept it fairly straight-forward: felons should not be allowed to take advantage of the private offering exemptions.

Dodd-Frank

Section 926 of Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to adopt rules disqualifying an offering from reliance on Rule 506 of Regulation D when certain felons or other “bad actors” are involved in the offering. Rule 506 is the most widely claimed exemption under Regulation D. For the 12 month period ended September 30, 2010 the Commission received 17,292 initial filings for offerings under Regulation D, of those 16,027 claimed a Rule 506 exemption.

What types of felonies?

The  proposal is not for all felonies, just those related to the securities industry. So you could be a convicted Under the proposed rule, a “disqualifying event” would include:

  • Criminal convictions in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, making of a false filing with the SEC or arising out of the conduct of certain types of financial intermediaries. The criminal conviction would have to have occurred within 10 years of the proposed sale of securities (or five years, in the case of the issuer and its predecessors and affiliated issuers).
  • Court injunctions and restraining orders in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, making of a false filing with the SEC or arising out of the conduct of certain types of financial intermediaries. The injunction or restraining order would have to have occurred within five years of the proposed sale of securities.
  • Final orders from state securities, insurance, banking, savings association or credit union regulators, federal banking agencies or the National Credit Union Administration that bar the issuer from:
    • associating with a regulated entity.
    • Engaging in the business of securities, insurance or banking.
    • Engaging in savings association or credit union activities.
  • Or orders that are based on fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive conduct and are issued within 10 years before the proposed sale of securities.
  • Certain Commission disciplinary orders relating to brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers, investment companies and investment advisers and their associated persons, which would be disqualifying for as long as the order is in effect;
  • Suspension or expulsion from membership in a “self-regulatory organization” or from association with an SRO member, which would be disqualifying for the period of suspension or expulsion;
  • Commission stop orders and orders suspending the Regulation A exemption issued within five years before the proposed sale of securities; and
  • U.S. Postal Service false representation orders issued within five years before the proposed sale of securities.

Who is covered?

The proposed rule would cover

  • the issuer (i.e. the fund)
  • its predecessors and affiliated issuers
  • Directors, officers, general partners and managing members of the issuer.
  • 10 percent beneficial owners and promoters of the issuer (i.e. the fund manager).
  • Persons compensated for soliciting investors
  • the general partners, directors, officers and managing members of any compensated solicitor (i.e. employees of your placement agents).

The rule is bit fuzzy on how this would apply to fund manager, since it is not legally the issuer. Under the investment advisers registration you already need to disclose criminal activity. That disclosure is broader than what is proposed under the new rule. This is just disclosure, not a bar from use of the offering exemption.

Reasonable Care Exception

The proposed rule would provide an exception from disqualification when the issuer can show it did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known that a disqualification existed.

Paragraph (c)(1) of this section shall not apply:

(i) Upon a showing of good cause and without prejudice to any other action by the Commission, if the Commission determines that it is not necessary under the circumstances that an exemption be denied; or

(ii) If the issuer establishes that it did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, that a disqualification existed under paragraph (c)(1) of this section.

Instruction to paragraph (c)(2)(ii). An issuer will not be able to establish that it has exercised reasonable care unless it has made factual inquiry into whether any disqualifications exist. The nature and scope of the requisite inquiry will vary based on the circumstances of the issuer and the other offering participants.

Here is where compliance steps in. The rule has no explicit record-keeping, reporting or disclosure requirements. But if you want make sure you can take advantage of the “reasonable care exception” you will need to keep records.  It looks like we will need a new form for employees to fill out asking for a disclosure of events under the rule. It also looks like you will need to run criminal background checks on your principals and key employees.

In the release the SEC said: “The steps required would vary with the circumstances, but we anticipate may include such steps as making appropriate inquiry of covered persons and reviewing information on publicly available databases.”

Comments

This is still a proposed rule, but time is short. Under Dodd-Frank, the disqualification rules need to be in place by July 21, 2011. There is time to Submit Comments.

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Learning Lessons From Gaffken & Barriger

I read through an occasional SEC complaint looking for lessons to be learned. Those involving real estate funds particularly catch my eye. I found the complaint against Lloyd V. Barriger (.pdf) and his management of his Gaffken & Barriger Fund to be full of lessons.

I don’t have any independent facts and am accepting the complaint at face value. Barringer has not settled with the SEC so I’m sure he has a different view of the events and disagrees with some of the statements. In large part it looks like he was trying to make it through the collapse of the housing market and the liquidity crunch of 2007 & 2008 by stretching his funds and his investments. Ultimately, his fund could not hold out any longer and collapsed.

“In the midst of the credit crisis, Barriger chose to lie about the solvency and liquidity of his fund rather than admit the somber truth of a collapsing business,” said George Canellos, Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office. “He continued to solicit new investor funds based on the same misrepresentations up until the day before the fund collapsed.”

Gaffken & Barriger started off by investing in microcap securities. Then it, like many investors, was lured by the outsized returns of the real estate in 1998. Effective August 1,2005, the Fund’s stated purpose was “investing, holding, and trading in real estate, real estate loans, real estate securities, other securities and other financial instruments and rights thereto[.]” According to the PPM, the Fund’s primary strategy was “hard money lending”making high interest short-term bridge loans to real estate developers.

As you might guess with hindsight, the fund started experiencing higher delinquencies in 2005 and started experiencing losses. I would guess that he started stretching the truth hoping his investments would bounce back, only be trapped into bigger lies as the losses grew instead of decreasing.

I found it interesting that the SEC focused on the preferred returns to the limited partners in the fund. This is a practice that is common in many real estate funds. Investors often get a preferred return and the sponsor gets an over-sized portion of the profit above that return. I think the SEC got caught up in the tax allocations of the fund and took it as a bad fact. I’m not sure that warranted.

Another lesson to take away is that Dodd-Frank will not do anything to prevent this type of fraud. Given the size of Gaffken & Barriger it would not be SEC registered, but would be state registered. The SEC would still be able to investigate, but would not be the examiner.

That is a common theme I have noticed in SEC complaints against investment advisers and fund managers. They are mostly below the $100 million threshold for SEC registration. These troublemakers will need to be caught by state examiners. The SEC may be able to come riding in on its white horse to round up the bad guys, but will not be in a position to make an early intervention to prevent the fraud.

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The SEC Uses a Shiny New Tool

Earlier this year the Securities and Exchange Commission announced a new initiative encouraging cooperation. They wanted to start using Cooperation Agreements, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, and Non-prosecution Agreements.

They finally got use one of their shiny new tools. The SEC announced that Tenaris S.A. entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement.

The SEC alleged that Tenaris, a global manufacturer of steel pipe products, violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by bribing Uzbekistan government officials during a bidding process to supply pipelines for transporting oil and natural gas. Tenaris made almost $5 million in profits from those contracts. As part of the DPA, the SEC is requiring Tenaris to cough up $5.4 million.

In addition to paying cast, Tenaris needs to do the following under the DPA:

  • Cooperate with SEC in the investigation
  • Not break the law
  • Not claim a tax break or seek an insurance claim for $5.4 million penalty
  • Update its code of conduct annually
  • Require each director, officer and management-level employee to certify compliance with the code of conduct
  • Train employees on the FCPA

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Report on SEC Referrals to Enforcement

For a registered investment adviser, it’s okay to have the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations visit you. It’s a big problem if the enforcement division visit. OCIE will issue a deficiency letter asking you to fix any deficiencies it finds. If your noncompliance is serious or the examiners think investor funds are at risk, OCIE can refer the case to the enforcement division.

We get to see how well this referral process works as part of a recent Inspector General Report: OCIE Regional Offices’ Referrals to Enforcement (.pdf)

This report was triggered by the fallout from the Stanford case. “The OIG found that the SEC’s Fort Worth regional office had been aware since 1997 that Robert Allen Stanford was likely operating a Ponzi scheme. The investigation also discovered that after a series of OCIE examinations of Stanford Group Company (Stanford’s registered investment advisor) in which each examination concluded that the likelihood of a Ponzi scheme or similar fraud existed, the SEC’s Fort Worth Enforcement unit did not take significant action to investigate or stop such expected fraud until late 2005.” The allegation against the Fort Worth enforcement office is that they were being judged on the number of cases they won. They wanted to stay away from Stanford because is would consume lots of resources and had an uncertain outcome. The OIG claims there was perception that they only wanted “quick-hot” or “slam-dunk”cases.

The OIG report’s objective was to determine “whether and to what extent OCIE examiners were frustrated in matters other than Stanford where Enforcement did not pursue cases identified by examiners in the SEC regional offices.”

One highlight was that the OCIE staff identified thethe SEC’s Asset Management Unit as having significantly assisted with the acceptance rate of referrals.

They also highlight the the different missions and focuses of OCIE and Enforcement: “OCIE focuses its efforts on assessing whether SEC registrants are in compliance with securities laws, while Enforcement’s mission is to protect investors and the markets by investigating potential violations of securities laws and litigating the SEC’s enforcement actions.”

More on the Proposed Limitations on Compensation for Fund Managers

There is a new joint federal rule in the works for all financial institutions. This will lump together banks, credit unions, broker-dealers and investment advisers. If you have more than $1 billion in assets under management, you need to pay attention to this rule.

Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires federal regulators to

“prescribe regulations or guidelines to require each covered financial institution to disclose to the appropriate Federal regulator the structures of all incentive-based compensation arrangements offered by such covered financial institutions sufficient to determine whether the compensation structure:

(A) provides an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of the bank holding company with covered financial institution with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or

(B) could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution.”

The proposed rule is tied to the proposed method of calculation for the investment advisers and private fund managers released in November 2010. Unfortunately, the Form ADV in that proposed rule has not yet been finalized, so we don’t know exactly how that assets under management will be calculated. Assuming there are not big changes to the new Form ADV, if your fund assets plus uncalled capital commitments are in excess of $1 billion, then you are a “covered financial institution.

If you are a “covered financial institution” then you must submit a new report to the SEC. In that report you will need to describe the structure of your incentive-based compensation arrangements and whether they provide for excessive compensation or could lead to to material financial loss. This report must include the following:

  1. A clear narrative description of the components of the covered financial institution’s incentive-based compensation arrangements applicable to covered persons and specifying the types of covered persons to which they apply;
  2. A succinct description of the covered financial institution’s policies and procedures governing its incentive-based compensation arrangements for covered persons
  3. If the covered financial institution has total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more, an additional succinct description of incentive-based compensation policies and procedures specific to the covered financial institution’s:
    (i) Executive officers; and
    (ii) Other covered persons who the board of directors, or a committee thereof, of the covered financial institution has identified and determined under §248.205(b)(3)(ii) of subpart C of this part individually have the ability to expose the covered financial institution to possible losses that are substantial in relation to the covered financial institution’s size, capital, or overall risk tolerance;
  4. Any material changes to the covered financial institution’s incentive-based compensation arrangements and policies and procedures made since the covered financial institution’s last report submitted under paragraph (a) of this section; and
  5. The specific reasons why the covered financial institution believes the structure of its incentive-based compensation plan does not encourage inappropriate risks by the covered financial institution by providing covered persons with:
    (i) Excessive compensation; or
    (ii) Incentive-based compensation that could lead to a material financial loss to the covered financial institution.

“Covered person” means any executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of a covered financial institution.  (So, everyone.)

According to the SEC’s Office of Risk, Strategy and Financial Innovation there are about 132 broker-dealers with assets of $1billion or more and 18 with assets in excess of $50 billions. Since investment advisers do not currently report their assets so the SEC lacks hard numbers. They estimated that about 70 investment advisers meet the $1 billion asset threshold and only about 10 would be large enough to get hit by the proposed bonus retention rules. (see page 70 of the proposed draft (.pdf).)

I assume that the investment adviser counts do not take into account the thousands of hedge fund, private equity fund and real estate fund managers who will be registering with the SEC in the next few months.

The rule will not require a report on the actual compensation. But it does try to limit incentive-based compensation that is “unreasonable or disproportionate to the services performed.”

For private equity funds, this should just be a paperwork issue and not a substantive issue. Since private equity funds pay most of their performance based on the final realization of assets in the fund, there are generally few short-term incentives. Private equity fund managers get their incentive pay when their investors get paid.

Nevertheless, this rule will be a headache for registered private fund managers.

The rule has not yet been officially published by the SEC. They are waiting for the other federal regulators to formally approve the draft.

Sources:

The Buck Stops Here – Harry S. Truman Presidential Museum and Library – Independence, Missouri / Marshall Astor / http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/

The SEC Continues to Investigate Side Pockets and Valuations

The SEC brought another case against a private investment fund for misuse of side pockets. Lawrence R. Goldfarb of Baystar Capital Management agreed to pay a hefty fine to settle claims brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission for misuse of his investment fund’s assets.

When used properly, a side pocket is a mechanism that a hedge fund uses to separate illiquid investments from the liquid investments. If a fund investor redeems their investment in a hedge fund with a side pocket, the investor cannot redeem the pro-rata portion of their investment allocated to the side pocket. That portion of the redemption is delayed until the asset is liquidated or is released from the side pocket. It’s a way to protect all of the investors when the fund has a big chunk of illiquid assets. A wave of redemptions would force the sale of liquid assets, leaving those who did not redeem with the illiquid assets.

The typical abuse is to hide under-performing assets from limited partner scrutiny. The manager still collects the management fee on the over-valued assets. Without recognizing the loss, partners are less likely to redeem their capital.

The SEC complaint alleges that Goldfarb acted even more egregiously than disguising valuations. He stole profits from the fund.

The complaint states that Goldfarb’s fund invested in a real estate partnership. Since that investment was likely a very illiquid asset it would typically end up in a side pocket. Shortly after the investment was made the real estate partnership started making cash distributions. Goldfarb has these distributions sent to him instead of the investment fund. He ended up transferring the whole interest to himself, using the side pocket to hide the asset and the distributions.

At first I thought this might be an interesting action to highlight Rule 206(4)-8. From the complaint, is sounds more like a case of blatant theft from the fund. This enforcement actions shows that the SEC is focusing on private funds, valuations, side pockets and affiliate transactions.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Goldfarb and Baystar Capital Management consented to permanent injunctions against violations of certain provisions of the federal securities laws and to pay disgorgement of $12,112,416 and prejudgment interest of $1,967,371, which will be distributed to the fund’s investors. Goldfarb also agreed to pay a $130,000 penalty, be barred from associating with any investment adviser or broker (with the right to reapply in five years), and be barred from participating in any offering of penny stock.

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