The Biden Strategy on Fighting Corruption

Yesterday’s story on FinCEN planning new Real Estate Anti-Money Laundering Regulations is just part of the larger plan of the Biden administration’s plan to fight corruption. For more details check out the recently released United States Strategy on Countering Corruption.

This is full of worthy goals. The stability of the US dollar is big lure for dirty money. I have some concerns about overly weaponizing the dollar internationally for fear that some other currency will take over as the de facto currency of the world. Right now, there are no other good candidates.

As for the details on the White House plan, I focused on how it might directly affect me.

One is the return of the 2015 rulemaking to “prescribe minimum standards for antimoney laundering programs and suspicious activity reporting requirements for certain investment advisor.” This time there is a particular focus on hedge funds, trusts, private equity funds and other vehicles. In particular, it looks like there will some focus on operations of private placements.

The White House is also looking at the gatekeepers to transactions: lawyers, accountants, and registered agents. They may hit with some anti-money laundering requirements, both as recordkeepers and targets for enforcement.

As yesterday’s story on real estate pointed out that it has been a tool for laundering money, the White House strategy includes a focus on digital assets and art. Those are two areas that are believed to be exploited by illicit money.

Sources:

FinCEN Sets Foundation for Real Estate Anti-Money Laundering Regulations

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has gotten more active in fighting money laundering. While the last administration mostly focused on putting parties on the sanctions list, the current administration is looking to expand regulatory requirements. One of the several initiative recently launched is targeted at real estate.

On December 8, FinCEN announced an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on real estate transactions. It’s an advanced notice so there is no text to parse, just areas for discussion. The focus is on recordkeeping and reporting requirements on for people participating in transactions involving non-financed purchases of real estate.

Unlike the Geographic Targeted Orders, this new rulemaking could include commercial real estate. FinCEN recently renewed the Geographic Targeted Orders for all-cash purchases of real estate in Boston; Chicago; Dallas-Fort Worth; Honolulu; Las Vegas; Los Angeles; Miami; New York City; San Antonio; San Diego; San Francisco; and Seattle.

FinCEN is looking for comment on the potential scope of regulations. It has identified a few areas specifically:

  1. Scope of recordkeeping and reporting
  2. Who should be subject to the requirements
  3. Which types of real estate purchases should be covered
  4. Geographic scope of such a requirement,
  5. Appropriate reporting dollar-value threshold.

FinCEN is also looking for general comments on the risk of money laundering and other illicit financial activities in the real estate market and the extent to which any reporting requirements would address that risk. In footnote 76, FinCEN lists a bunch of prosecuted cases in which real estate was a vehicle for money laundering:

  • United States v. Real Property Located in Potomac, Maryland, Commonly Known as 9908 Bentcross Drive, Potomac, MD 20854, Case No. 20-cv-02071, Doc. 1 (D. Md. Jul. 15, 2020) (purchase of property in Potomac, MD)
  • United States v. Raul Torres, Case No. 1:19CR390, Doc. 30 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2020) (purchase of multiple properties in Cleveland, OH); United States v. Bradley, No. 3:15-cr-00037- 2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141157 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2019) (purchase of multiple properties in Wayne County, MI);
  • United States v. Coffman, 859 F. Supp. 2d 871 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (purchases of properties in Kentucky and South Carolina);
  • United States v. Paul Manafort, Case 1:18-cr-00083-TSE, Doc. 14 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 2018) (purchase of a property in Virginia);
  • United States v. Miller, 295 F. Supp. 3d 690 (E.D. Va. 2018) (purchase of properties in Virginia and Delaware);
  • Atty. Griev. Comm’n of Md. v. Blair, 188 A.3d 1009 (MD Ct. App. 2018) (purchase of properties in Washington, DC and Maryland);
  • United States v. Patrick Ifediba, et al., Case No. 2:18-cr-00103-RDP-JEO, Doc. 1 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2018) (purchase of multiple properties in Alabama);
  • United States v. Delgado, 653 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2011) (purchase of multiple properties in Kansas City, MO),
  • United States v. Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2009) (purchase of multiple properties in El Paso, TX);
  • United States v. 10.10 Acres Located on Squires Rd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 613 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (purchase of two properties in North Carolina);
  • State v. Harris, 861 A.2d 165 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (purchase of multiple properties in a non-GTO-covered jurisdiction in New Jersey);
  • see also Lakshmi Kumar & Kaisa de Bel, “Acres of Money Laundering: Why U.S. Real Estate is a Kleptocrat’s Dream,” Global Financial Integrity, p. 29 (Aug. 2021) (highlighting money laundering cases outside of jurisdictions covered by the Real Estate GTOs)

Comments on the proposed rulemaking must be received on or before February 7, 2022.

Sources:

ENABLERS Act

With the release of the Pandora Papers, there is a renewed focus on the illicit movement of money and filling the holes in anti-money laundering rules. “The Washington Post and other news organizations exposed the involvement of political leaders, examined the growth of the industry within the United States and demonstrated how secrecy shields assets from governments, creditors and those abused or exploited by the wealthy and powerful.”

A bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced legislation that would require investment advisers, trust companies, lawyers, art dealers and others to investigate foreign clients seeking to move money and assets into the American financial system. The group got creative with the name of the bill: “Establishing New Authorities for Businesses Laundering and Enabling Risks to Security Act“. Which <surprise> acronyms into the ENABLERS Act.

The ENABLERS ACT would add new groups to the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act and require rulemaking to implement the requirements. The new groups:

  1. “person engaged in the business of providing investment advice for compensation”
  2. Dealers in art, antiques, or collectibles
  3. Lawyers
  4. Trust companies
  5. Public accountants
  6. Public relations in such a manner as to provide another person anonymity
  7. Third-party payment services

The first category is the most important to me. Investment advisers have been lobbying to stay outside of the Bank Secrecy Act because of the custodian requirements. The client accounts are held at financial institutions that are subject to the Bank Secrecy Act. The success of that argument has been diminishing over the years.

Art dealers are a big one. There is already regulations moving into place to deal with that industry. It’s notorious as a way to move value around illicitly.

Lawyers are tough because of attorney-client privilege. I’m not sure how public accountants fit into the picture.

I wonder what PR firms did to anger the people who wrote this bill.

Of course it’s only a bill. A lot of things will have to happen to get this into law. Congress is not exactly a well-functioning organization right now.

Sources:

Fine Art, Money Laundering, and Influence Peddling

The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 brought art dealers under the umbrella of anti-money laundering regulation. Section 6110(a) of the AML Act amends the definition of “financial institution” under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to include persons “engaged in the trade of antiquities” and directs FinCEN to promulgate implementing regulations.

The value of fine art and antiquities are inherently subjective and allow for a wide range of sale prices. The good stuff also weighs significantly less than cash. A painting worth $2.5 million is easier to transport than 275 pounds of $20 bills for the equivalent value. At the freeport in Geneva, you can sell the art without even moving it or paying taxes on the gain.

Now U.S. art dealers will have to file suspicious activities reports for cash transactions.

Into this fray steps Hunter Biden, the President’s son who is looking to sell some of his paintings.

“Everyone should try pushing brushes around. And if someone wants to pay you a half-million for the results: Cash that check.”

https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/hunter-biden-art-worth-500-110000217.html

This raises the ethical issue of buying Hunter Biden’s artwork in an attempt to influence President Biden. According to the Washington Post story, the White House is trying to craft an ethical wall around the potential purchases to keep them anonymous. It’s a bad spot to have presidential family members selling art that is highly subjective in value into a market that is under scrutiny for anti-money laundering efforts.

The best answer is to just say “no.” Wait three (or seven) years to start selling the art after President Biden is out of office. It looks terrible to be trading on his father’s name and role as president.

Sources:

Suspicious Activity Reporting

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Examinations released a Risk Alert on Compliance Issues Related to Suspicious Activity Monitoring and Reporting at Broker-Dealers. While it spent most of the publication laying out the vague requirements of reporting suspicious activity, it took a sharp turn and listed six types of activities that the SEC would consider suspicious activity that should be reported.

  1. Large deposits of low-priced securities, followed by the near-immediate liquidations of those securities and then wiring out the proceeds.
  2. Patterns of trading activity common to several customers including, but not limited to, the sales of large quantities of low-priced securities of multiple issuers by the customers.
  3. Trading in thinly traded, low-priced securities that resulted in sudden spikes in price or that represented most, if not all, of the securities’ daily trading volumes.
  4. Trading in the stock of issuers that were shell companies or had been subject to trading suspensions or whose affiliates, officers, or other insiders had a history of securities law violations.
  5. Questionable background of customers such as the fact that they were the subject of criminal, civil, or regulatory actions relating to, among other things, securities law violations.
  6. Trading in the stock of issuers for which over-the-counter stock quotation systems had published warnings because the issuers had ceased to comply with their SEC financial reporting obligations or for which the firms relied on a “freely tradeable” legal opinion that was inconsistent with publicly available information.

I found this to be a great reference list.

Sources:

Ignoring Iranian Red Flags

There are a few places around the world that you know you can’t do business with. Iran and North Korea have very strict limitations. If it pops up that your business partner wants to ship your products to one of these countries, it’s time to get legal and compliance on the phone before you agree to that sale.

UniControl, Inc., a manufacturer of process controls, airflow pressure switches, boiler controls, and other instrumentation, based in Ohio ran into this problem and violated the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations.

From 2013 to 2017, UniControl exported 21 shipments of air pressure switches, valued at $687,189,
to European company that were subsequently reexported the shipments to Iran. U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control took action against UniControl because it failed to take appropriate steps in response to multiple warning signs that its goods were being reexported to Iran.

Early in their relationship, one of these European trade partners told UniControl that it had a significant market for UniControl’s goods in Iran and inquired whether UniControl could serve as a supplier. UniControl rightfully said “no.” It otherwise didn’t take any steps to ensure the re-shipment to Iran would not actually happen.

UniControl really screwed up when it entered into a sales representative agreement with a European trade partner that explicitly listed Iran as a target for sales. UniControl employees met with the partner at a trade conference and met with Iranian nationals at the partner’s booth.

The last step was a request from the trade partner to remove the “Made in the USA” label from the products. “The European trade partner explained that the Iranian end-user may have problems with the stated origin of the products.” The company engaged outside counsel to figure out how much trouble it was in. Sadly, it still sent some of the shipments.

What saved the company was largely self-reporting the problem and investing in a more robust compliance program.

Sources:

Corporate Transparency Act

I’m not sure what Anti-Money Laundering has to do with the United States military, but Congress included big changes to anti-money laundering law in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2021. After a veto by President Trump and an override by Congress, NDAA has become the law, including Section 6401-6403, the Corporate Transparency Act.

It’s really easy to create a corporation, limited liability company or limited partnership in the United States. There are many, many legal, reasonable and important reasons to be able to do so. From the law enforcement and government sanctions parties, they see the company structure merely as an impediment to their ability to push bad guys out of the US banking system. The government side won and it may have a dramatic impact on the creation and reporting of companies.

The Corporate Transparency Act will require companies to submit a report of their beneficial interest to the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes and Enforcement Center. For new companies, this information has to be submitted at the time of formation. Existing companies will have to submit this information within two years. All companies will have to update the information for a change of ownership within one year after the change.

The reporting requirement will not apply to all companies, just to any company that fits into the definition of “Reporting Company.” That definition has a lengthy list of companies that are exceptions and fall outside the scope of the Reporting Company definition. Of the twenty-four exceptions, there are some obvious types: public companies, banks, and broker-dealers.

I really wanted to focus on the possible impact on me and private fund managers.

Section 6403 of the NDAA adds a new section 5336 to Title 31 of the US Code. I focused on this exception in 31 USC 5336(a)(11) from the definition of “Reporting Company”:

‘‘(xi) an investment adviser—
(I) described in section 203(l) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b–3(l)); and
(II) that has filed Item 10, Schedule A, and Schedule B of Part 1A of Form ADV, or any successor thereto, with the Securities and Exchange Commission;

So registered investment advisors that report their ownership on Form ADV are not Reporting Companies and don’t have to report ownership. Obviously, they are already reporting ownership.

There is an exception for pooled investment vehicles operated or advised by investment advisers:

‘‘(xviii) any pooled investment vehicle that is operated or advised by a person described in clause (iii), (iv), (vii), (x), or (xi)

Although the definition of “pooled investment vehicle” is very specific:

(A) any investment company, as defined in section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a–3(a)); or
(B) any company that—
(i) would be an investment company under that section but for the exclusion provided from that definition by paragraph (1) or (7) of section 3(c) of that Act (15 U.S.C. 80a–3(c));
and
(ii) is identified by its legal name by the applicable investment adviser in its Form ADV (or successor form) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Later, there is a broader exception:

‘‘(xxii) any corporation, limited liability company, or other similar entity of which the ownership interests are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by 1 or more entities described in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii) (xix), or (xxi);

Companies owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a registered investment adviser also fall outside the definition of “reporting company.”

This would seem to be good for private fund managers. The funds and fund subsidiaries seem to fall outside the definition of Reporting Company.

There is still a long path until we get to the point of having to do this reporting. FinCEN will have to establish the regulatory framework and the database to hold this information. It’s not clear how the reporting requirement will specifically interact with the various state secretaries of state who are responsible for company formation.

Sources:

Due Diligence for Politically Exposed Persons

Anti-money laundering 101 is to lookout for for terrorists, drug kingpins and oligarchs. You don’t want to do business with these people because they are on the government enforcement lists. AML 102 is to look out for “politically exposed persons.”

The international Financial Action Task Force defines a “politically exposed person as:

“an individual who is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function. Due to their position and influence, it is recognised that many PEPs are in positions that potentially can be abused for the purpose of committing money laundering offences and related predicate offences, including corruption and bribery, as well as conducting activity related to terrorist financing.”

You’re not barred from doing business with a politically exposed. You just need to be on higher alert to make sure the person is not using pilfered money or funneling money to bad people. The mayor of a small town should probably not be depositing millions of dollars in a personal account.

Last month FinCEN issued a new FAQ on client due diligence. That FAQ eschewed any bright-line testing or standards.

Two weeks ago, FinCEN joined up with the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to issue a joint statement on due diligence for politically exposed persons.

Like the earlier FAQ, this joint release adds very little to the compliance dialog.

“Banks must apply a risk-based approach to CDD in developing the risk profiles of their customers, including PEPs, and are required to establish and maintain written procedures reasonably designed to identify and verify beneficial owners of legal entity customers. More specifically, banks must adopt appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting CDD that, among other things, enable banks to: (i) understand the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile, and (ii) conduct ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk basis, to maintain and update customer information.”

The joint statement does point out that there is no formal definition of a politically exposed person. Agreed.

The joint statement states that US public officials are not “politically exposed persons.” Disagree.

As I said above, the mayor of a small town should probably not be depositing millions of dollars in a personal account. Your financial institution should be keeping a close eye on the mayor to make sure illicit money does not come through you.

Unfortunately, this de-regulatory approach will put the burden on compliance having to push back against client relationship people. You will have to add on additional review to watch whether the politically exposed person breaks bad.

Sources:

New FinCEN FAQs on Client Due Diligence

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued its latest collection of Frequently Asked Questions on the requirements for Customer Due Diligence requirements for Covered Financial Institutions. For anyone looking for decisive answers and bright-line tests, you’ll have to look elsewhere. The answers will leave you wondering why FinCEN even bothered to publish this answers.

Private fund managers and Registered Investment Advisers are not Covered Financial Institutions under the Customer Due Diligence Rule. I believe most adhere to the guidance to make sure they don’t run afoul of FinCEN.

The 2017 Customer Due Diligence Rule did create some bright-line tests on due diligence, particularly for potential investors in private funds that are not individuals. The uncertainty before the rule was how much diligence did you need to conduct on the entity. The 2017 Rule made it clear. You have to collect information on individuals who, directly or indirectly own 25% or more of the equity interests and one individual who has managerial control of the entity.

The new FAQ answers questions in three broad general areas about whether you must conduct additional diligence at opening, risk ratings for customers, and ongoing diligence requirements.

The answers all are squishy answers. It’s up the financial institution to develop policies based on risk. One example:

“There is no categorical requirement that financial institutions update customer information on a continuous or periodic schedule. The requirement to update customer information is risk based and occurs as a result of normal monitoring.”

I’m going to guess that the answers to the questions are not going make compliance officers feel any better. It might just confirm that what they are doing is okay, or at least, not wrong.

Sources:

OFAC Issues a Framework for Compliance Commitments

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is published A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments. OFAC wants to provide organizations its perspective on the essential components of a sanctions compliance program.

“As the United States continues to enhance our sanctions programs, ensuring that the private sector implements strong and effective compliance programs that protect the U.S. financial system from abuse is a key part of our strategy.”

Sigal P. Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.

The United States has increasingly used its financial system to penalize countries it dislikes as well as drug kingpins and terrorists. The dollar has been the standard for international business. That may change if the US continues to weaponize the dollar against countries it disfavors.

OFAC has decided to coin the initialism “SCP” for Sanctions Compliance Program. An SCP has five essential components:

1. Management Commitment

  • Senior management has reviewed and approved the SCOP
  • Senior management delegate sufficient authority and provided direct reporting lines
  • Senior management has given adequate resources to the SCP
  • Senior management promotes a culture of compliance
  • Senior management recognizes the seriousness of deficiencies and violations

2. Risk Assessment

  • Organization has conducted an OFAC risk assessment
  • Organization has a methodology to identify and address the risks it identifies

3. Internal Controls

  • Written policies and procedures
  • Internal controls based on risk assessment
  • Enforces policies and procedures
  • Adequate record-keeping
  • Corrects discovered weaknesses
  • Communicates policies and procedures to relevant staff
  • Personnel appointed to integrate policies and procedures into corporate operations.

4. Testing and Auditing

  • Testing and auditing is accountable to senior management
  • Testing and auditing are appropriately sophisticated
  • Takes corrective actions after a negative result.

5. Training

  • OFAC Training provides adequate information
  • Training scope is appropriate
  • Training frequency is appropriate based on risk profile
  • Updates training after a negative result
  • Training provides easily accessible resources.

The Framework includes a short appendix that offers some analysis of some of the causes of sanctions violations that OFAC identified during its investigative process.

Sources: