Doug Cornelius

Text of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

You can find the complet text of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on the Department of Justice’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act site.

§ 78dd-2. Prohibited foreign trade practices by domestic concerns

(a) Prohibition

It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other than an issuer which is subject to section 78dd-1 of this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such domestic concern or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to–

(1) any foreign official for purposes of–

(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or

(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,

in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person;

(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office for purposes of–

(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candidate in its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or candidate to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or

(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,

in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person;

(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of–

(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or

(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,

in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.

(b) Exception for routine governmental action

Subsections (a) and (i) of this section shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party official.

(c) Affirmative defenses

It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) or (i) of this section that–

(1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country; or

(2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly related to–

(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or

(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.

Who is a Foreign Official under the FCPA?

The FCPA defines “foreign official” as:

[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization.

It is obvious that person holding political office is a foreign official. In this age of increasing privitization of government services and the sudden investment of government investment in private businesses, it is not clear when an entity is an “instrumentality” of a foreign government.

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention uses the term “public enterprise” which it defines to include “any enterprise in which the government holds a majority stake, as well as those over which a government may exercise a dominant influence directly or indirectly.

Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway? by Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland, and Adam P. Wolf of Clifford Chance examine some of thses issues in great detail. You can find the article in the August 2008 edition of The Business Lawyer.

Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists

The National Research Council has published a new report finding that all U.S. agencies with counterterrorism programs that collect personal data should be required to evaluate the programs’ effectiveness, lawfulness, and impacts on privacy.

In its press release, they summarize that “Collecting and examining data to try to identify terrorists inevitably involves privacy violations, since even well-managed programs necessarily result in some “false positives” where innocent people are flagged as possible threats, and their personal information is examined. A mix of policy and technical safeguards could minimize these intrusions, the report says. Indeed, reducing the number of false positives also improves programs’ effectiveness by focusing attention and resources on genuine threats.”

The report, Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists: A Framework for Program Assessment, is available from The National Acadamies Press in paperback or free online.

“All U.S. agencies with counterterrorism programs that collect or “mine” personal data — such as phone records or Web sites visited — should be required to evaluate the programs’ effectiveness, lawfulness, and impacts on privacy. A framework is offered that agencies can use to evaluate such information-based programs, both classified and unclassified. The book urges Congress to re-examine existing privacy law to assess how privacy can be protected in current and future programs and recommends that any individuals harmed by violations of privacy be given a meaningful form of redress. Two specific technologies are examined: data mining and behavioral surveillance. Regarding data mining, the book concludes that although these methods have been useful in the private sector for spotting consumer fraud, they are less helpful for counterterrorism because so little is known about what patterns indicate terrorist activity. Regarding behavioral surveillance in a counterterrorist context, the book concludes that although research and development on certain aspects of this topic are warranted, there is no scientific consensus on whether these techniques are ready for operational use at all in counterterrorism.”


Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terro …

Read this FREE online! Full Book \| PDF Summary

Kay – Certiorari Denied

The U.S. Supreme Court will not be reviewing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kay v. U.S. (cert denied shows up page 8 of the Orders List from October 6, 2008.)

Kay argued that the FCPA didn’t apply to bribes to reduce taxes, or that if it applied, the “obtaining or retaining” language in the law (the business nexus element) is so ambiguous that enforcement in their case would be unfair.

Compliance programs need to be aimed not just at bribes intended to directly help obtain business from foreign governments but also to any overseas public bribery that might create a commercial advantage. Complaince needs to find any payments to reduce taxes, speed up refunds, jump customs lines, obtain favorable inspections, manipulate business registrations, reduce utility costs, or enhance property usage.

Social Networking for Lawyers and Legal IT

I had the pleasure of hosting a lunch meeting for the International Legal Technology Association to talk about Social Networking for Lawyers and Legal IT.

I was joined by Jenn Steele and Bob Ambrogi in talking about Facebook, LinkedIn, blogging, Twitter, Legal OnRamp and Martindale Connected. We looked at the ways we each use these tools and how the audience used the tools. We also talked a bit about policy and rules for using these sites.

Here is the slide deck we used. You can also get the slides with our notes on JD Supra: Social Networking for Lawyers and Legal IT.

Social Networking

View SlideShare presentation or Upload your own. (tags: social km)

(We deleted the slides on LegalOnRamp and Martindale Connected because we “borrowed” them from another presentation.)

Jenn Steele is the Director of Information Technology at Morrison Mahoney LLP. She holds an MBA from the Simmons School of Management and a B.S. in Biology from MIT, with a minor in Expository Writing. Prior to Morrison Mahoney, she was the Director of Information Technology at Donovan Hatem LLP from 2002-2007, and the Senior Applications Specialist at Burns & Levinson LLP from 2000-2002. She has also held positions in the health and human services industry. She is the author of Leading Geeks, a blog focusing on best practices for leading technologists (www.leadinggeeks.blogspot.com).

Robert Ambrogi is an internationally known legal journalist and a leading authority on law and the Web. He represents clients at the intersection of law, media and technology and is also established professional in alternative dispute resolution. Robert is a Massachusetts lawyer, writer and media consultant and is author of the book, The Essential Guide to the Best (and Worst) Legal Sites on the Web. He also writes the blog Media Law, co-writes Legal Blog Watch and cohosts the legal affairs podcast Lawyer2Lawyer.

Originally posted on my old blog, KM Space.

Walking The Fine Line Of Compliance In China

Jeffrey M. Rawitz and Erica L. Reilley of Jones Day published an article in Mondaq: China: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Walking The Fine Line Of Compliance In China.

Four Suggestions for Avoiding FCPA Complications in China

Any company seeking to avoid potential FCPA problems in China, or elsewhere, should start by developing a rigorous internal compliance program. A good compliance program will include clear standards and procedures and will provide thorough training for all employees that have business dealings with China or any other foreign nation. Compliance materials and training should be targeted to the employees receiving them; thus, employees in China should be trained by local staff that understand the FCPA and can take into account the likely cultural issues—e.g., the long-standing Chinese tradition of gift giving—that may have an impact on proper compliance.

In addition, companies can limit exposure to potential FCPA problems through vigilant adherence to corporate due diligence. As noted above in the section on successor liability, U.S. enforcement authorities do not always view a merger or acquisition as extinguishing liability for past unlawful conduct. Thus, a company planning to merge with or acquire a company that has done business in China will need to do its due diligence on the target company’s business dealings, including those of its partners, agents, and distributors, to ensure FCPA compliance.

A third suggested practice to limit FCPA exposure is to negotiate and draft contracts that minimize FCPA risks. A company can do this by incorporating standard representations, warranties, and covenants in contracts with agents and distributors wherein they affirm their understanding of the FCPA and their commitment to comply with its requirements. Appropriate oversight of these agents and distributors, via inspection of business records and financial reports, may also prove helpful to ensuring a company’s overarching compliance with the FCPA.

Finally, a company’s potential FCPA liability can be minimized by forming an investigative team that can respond quickly when potential FCPA issues arise. The first part of this process requires that employees feel comfortable raising potential issues as they come up—compliance training can be particularly helpful here in assuring employees that the company wants to know of these concerns. Typically it is best for in-house counsel to be responsible for receiving such reports and for managing the resulting investigations. Lawyers usually can best assess the potential for liability (and thus the need for a complete and thorough investigation), and they can take appropriate precautions to keep the identity of the reporting employee confidential. Where notice of potential FCPA liability comes from U.S. enforcement authorities, it often is best to have in-house counsel work closely with outside counsel to provide a certain level of independence and objectivity throughout the investigation as well as to cooperate with enforcement authorities, if needed.

Shearman & Sterling’s FCPA Digest

Danforth Newcomb of Shearman & Sterling LLP put together a digest of FCPA cases and review releases (.pdf) relating to bribes of foreign officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (through February 13, 2008).

Product Samples and The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

Richard L. Cassin of The FCPA Blog highlights Review Procedure Release No. 81-02 from December 11, 1981: A Rare (Or Medium-Rare) Opportunity. The release helps give a roadmap on how to introduce new products to potential government customers in foreign countries without violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

In Release 81-02 (December 11, 1981), the Department stated it would take no enforcement action where the requestor wished to provide samples of its products to officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Department stated that theFCPA was not implicated where (i) the samples were intended for the officials’ inspection, testing, and sampling; (ii) the samples were not intended for their personal use; and (iii) the Soviet government had been informed that the company intended to provide the samples. (From the DOJ Website Section 1.1.5)

History of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

In 1977, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as part of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act . The FCPA criminalized the bribery of foreign officials by U.S. corporations and individuals pursuing business in other countries and required that companies with publicly-traded stock meet certain standards regarding their accounting practices, books and records, and internal controls.

The FCPA consequently was amended in both 1988 and 1998. First in 1988, Congress added two affirmative defenses and directed the executive branch to urge America’s global trading partners to pass anti-corruption laws to promote international parity with regard to business corruption.

In 1998, the FCPA was again amended to implement the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Congress ratified the OECD Convention and enacted implementing legislation. These new amendments broadened the reach of potential FCPA bribery violations by expanding the scope of persons covered by the Act to include some foreign nationals. Also, the 1998 amendments extended the FCPA’s jurisdiction beyond America’s borders to allow greater enforcement efforts by U.S. prosecutors.